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INTRODUCTION

The new Montana Business Corporation Act (MBCA), enacted
by the Fifty-Second Montana Legislature,1 is the first complete revision of Montana's law controlling corporate governance in almost
twenty-five years. After an extensive study of the state's corporate
governance laws, the State Bar of Montana's Corporate Law Revision Committee (the "Committee") proposed revisions largely
based on the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation Act.2 The Committee included a broad spectrum of attorneys
representing private practice, government, a nonprofit organization, private industry and academia.3 With Representative Brent
Cromley of Billings as principal sponsor, the legislature enacted
the Committee's proposals, which are effective January 1, 1992.
The Committee set as its objectives clarification, simplification
and modernization of the law relating to corporate governance.
The majority of the changes serve the objective of clarifying Mon1. The legislature enacted the Montana Business Corporation Act (House Bill 552)
with only one dissenting vote on the final reading of the bill. MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL,
HISTORY AND FINAL STATUS OF BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF MONTANA FIFTY SECOND LEGISLATURE, HB 552, at 413 (1991).

2. The Committee also reviewed the Montana Nonprofit Corporation Act and recommended changes, many of which are based on the American Bar Association's Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act. The Committee recommendations concerning nonprofit
corporations were enacted into law. Many of the provisions of the nonprofit corporation law
are parallel to the business corporation law.
3. The expenses of the committee were generously funded by the State Bar, the
School of Law (with private funds), the Montana Secretary of State and Montana businesses. The following attorneys ably served the Committee: Robert Murdo (Vice Chair),
Justice Karla Gray (until her appointment to the Montana Supreme Court); Garth Jacobson, Bruce MacKenzie, Robert G. Michelotti, Jr. and Robert C. Pyfer. The Committee was
assisted by Jeff Pence and Bob Goodale (both UM School of Law, Class of 1991) and Charlotte Wilmerton and Cecelia Palmer (both law school staff). Those working on this project
were among the finest professional teams with which the author has had the privilege of
working.
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tana law. Because of the relatively small number of court cases decided under the prior Montana Business Corporation Act, several
ambiguities in previous enactments had yet to be resolved." The
Committee believed that clarifying these ambiguities adds certainty to the law and allows corporate stakeholders 5 and attorneys
to engage in more precise planning.
The legislation also simplifies corporate governance in two respects. It eliminates needless formality6 and it allows the corporation additional flexibility with which to operate.7 The new flexibil4.

Among the more significant clarifications are:
a. Preemptive Rights. Many corporations elect to provide for preemptive
rights (rights of existing shareholders to purchase a pro-rata amount of any new
stock issue) in their articles of incorporation. When a corporation elects preemptive rights, the previous law was not always clear when these rights apply. The
new legislation provides a detailed definition of when preemptive rights accrue, if
the articles of incorporation provide for preemption rights. The articles of incorporation may alter the statutory provision concerning when preemptive rights accrue. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-535(2) (1991).
b. Service of Process. The previous statute did not "mesh" well with the
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the issue of service of process on a
dissolved corporation. The revisions clarify service on both active and dissolved
corporations. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-316 (1991).
c. Restrictions on Transfer of Stock. The new statute states that consent restrictions on the transfer of stock may not be manifestly unreasonable. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-628(4)(c) (1991).
d. Foreign Corporations. The new statute makes explicit the principle that
mere ownership of real estate is insufficient to require a corporation to obtain a
certificate of authority. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1026(2)(i) (1991). It also expressly provides that an unregistered foreign corporation may defend an action,
consistent with the Montana case of Duran v. Buttrey Food, Inc., 189 Mont. 381,
386, 616 P.2d 327, 330 (1980). MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1027(5) (1991).
e. Duties of Officers, Directors and Controlling Shareholders. The previous
legislation (and previous court cases) had several ambiguities concerning the duties of directors, officers and controlling shareholders and the consequences of violations of these duties. The new legislation clarifies many of the ambiguities. See
infra text accompanying notes 12-146.
f. Dissolved Corporations. The rights of creditors against dissolved corporations were not clear in many respects. The new legislation clarifies (and expands)
these rights. See infra text accompanying notes 195-247.
5. Stakeholders are those with a "stake" in the corporation. Stakeholders include officers, directors, shareholders, creditors and state government.
6. For example, the two-step filing procedure for dissolution (i.e., filing both a Statement of Intent to Dissolve and Articles of Dissolution) has been reduced to one step. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-933 (1991). Similarly, the requirement that two persons serve as corporate
officers has been eliminated. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-441 (1991). Likewise, the board of
directors is now able to make certain housekeeping amendments (e.g., changing a registered
agent or office) without having to seek the approval of shareholders. MONT. CODE ANN. § 351-226 (1991).
7. The old laws require cumulative voting, affirmative vote of two-thirds of the shareholders to take certain major corporate actions and other provisions that, while appropriate
for many corporations, are unnecessarily cumbersome for others. The new legislation allows
shareholders to opt out of these requirements if they so desire. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.
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ity in the law allows the shareholders in the corporation to
structure the corporation to meet their needs and expectations.
The Committee members agreed that the State of Montana should
afford informed shareholders the flexibility to structure their relationship as they please, so long as the rights of creditors and other
stakeholders are not unduly burdened.
The most significant changes are those that modernize Montana's law controlling corporate governance. Although many of
these changes follow statutory trends in other states,8 others stem
from the Committee's belief that Montana law should codify certain judicial trends. This article describes statutory changes that
fall primarily in the category of codifying judicial trends. It examines three specific dimensions of the new legislation: The duties of
directors, officers and controlling shareholders, 9 derivative actions10
and dissolution.1 ' The article will discuss existing case law in each
of these areas, because an understanding of existing case law is
critical to an understanding of the statutory modifications. Finally,
the article will describe the impact of legislation on the case law.
II.

DUTIES OF DIRECTORS, OFFICERS AND CONTROLLING
SHAREHOLDERS

With the increasing frequency of litigation by minority share§§ 35-1-227(3), 435, 823 & 933 (1991).
8. Examples of provisions of the law adopting statutory trends in other states
include:
a. Allowable CorporateNames. The confusing "deceptively similar" standard
against which names were previously evaluated has been discarded in favor of the
easier to apply "distinguishable" standard. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-308(2) (1991).
b. Alternative Dispute Resolution for Name Disputes. The new law, borrowing a provision from Minnesota, provides a simplified procedure for parties injured by a subsequently filed name, causing confusion, mistake or deception
among the public. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-310(3) (1991). The previous law required an aggrieved party to sue in state court under complex theories of unfair
competition or other unclear and cumbersome common law theories. J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9.1 (2d ed. 1984).
c. Considerationfor Stock. The new legislation changes previous law by allowing corporations to issue stock for any consideration deemed appropriate by
the directors, including promissory notes or future services. MONT. CODE ANN. §
35-1-623 (1991).
d. Limitation of Director Liability. Many states allow shareholders to amend
articles of incorporation to give directors greater protection than under previous
Montana law from liability to the shareholders or the corporation. The new law
provides that shareholders may adopt such limitations, but the directors who act
intentionally in inflicting harm on the corporation are not protected. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-1-216(2)(d) (1991).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 12-147.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 148-194.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 195-247.
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holders against officers, directors and controlling shareholders,1 2
the members of the Committee decided to examine the statutory
duties of directors, officers and controlling shareholders. The first
step in analyzing those duties is to determine to whom the duties
are owed. Historically, courts view the duties of those managing
the corporation as requiring maximization of profits for the benefit
of shareholders." Recently, however, at least twenty-eight states
have enacted statutes allowing those managing the corporation to
take into account the interest of other stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers and the community.1 ' The statutes,
often referred to as "other constituency" statutes, are usually enacted to help management of corporations fend off takeover bids
by out-of-state corporations." Because of a disagreement among
Committee members on the advisability of enacting anti-takeover
measures, the Committee decided not to propose an "other constituency" statute. Instead, the Committee agreed that the common
law rules governing the objective of a corporation ought to apply.
Common law clearly provides that a business corporation has as its
objective conducting the business to profit shareholders.", This
12. One commentator describes the increase in shareholder oppression cases as "phenomenal." Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits As a Remedy
for Close CorporationDissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 87 (1987) (citing F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS at

iii (2d ed. 1985)).

13. The best known of these cases is the historic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204
Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). In Dodge, the court found:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end,
and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to
the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to
other purposes.
Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
14. Hanson, Other Constituency States: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355,
1355 (1991).
15. Id. at 1356. Other constituency statutes allow corporate directors to more easily

recommend rejection of a hostile takeover attempt, notwithstanding the fact that the takeover would benefit shareholders by allowing them to sell their interest at a premium price.
In such case, directors may recommend rejection of the offer because of the negative impact
on employees and the community. The author agrees with the observation of Professor
Jonathan Macey that "it seems patently clear that the true purpose of these statutes is to
benefit a single nonshareholder constituency, namely top managers of publicly held corporations who want still another weapon in their arsenal of anti-takeover protective devices."
Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 26 (1991).
16. The best statement of the common law principles is found in the American Law
Institute Draft Principles of Corporate Governance.

§ 2.01. The Objective and Conduct of the Business Corporation.
A business corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain, except
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common law principle does not mean that corporations must
blindly pursue profits at the expense of the greater social well being. It has long been recognized that corporations may devote reasonable amounts of resources to the public welfare.1 7 Similarly,
corporations may also take into account ethical considerations
"reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct of
business,""8 even if such ethical considerations diminish profits. All
corporations benefit from a responsible and stable social and business climate. Reasonable contributions to that climate serve to
benefit shareholders in the long run.
Although the new legislation did not modify the common law
rule that those in control owe a primary duty to shareholders, the
legislation better defined the specific types of duties owed to shareholders. When scrutinizing the conduct of directors, officers and
controlling shareholders, the courts should examine three separate
duties. 9 First, courts should examine whether the directors and ofthat, whether or not corporate profit and shareholder gain are thereby enhanced,
the corporation, in the conduct of its business
(a) is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law,
(b) may take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business, and
(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01 at 25
(Tent. Draft No. 2, April 13, 1982).
17. See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404 (Del. Ch. 1969);
Union Pacific R.R. v. Trustees, Inc., 8 Utah 2d 101, 103-07, 329 P.2d 398, 399-402 (1958).
18. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
2.01(b), at 25 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 13, 1982).
19. Courts typically apply two of these duties primarily to directors. There is, however, some confusion as to the classification of the two primary duties of directors. This
article describes the two primary duties as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Some
commentators find different classifications of duties. Dennis J. Block, Nancy F. Barton and
Stephen A. Radin identify the duties as the duties of care, loyalty and candor. D. BLOCK, ET
AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 27 (3d ed.
1990). Others find separate duties of obedience, diligence and loyalty. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.05, at 10-12 (3d ed. 1978). This author prefers to
recognize only two duties for directors of all corporations: the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty. These two duties are those recognized by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
American Bar Association's Section of Business Law. Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Directors Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1599-1603 (1978). It was the ABA Committee
on Corporate Laws that promulgated the Revised Model Business Corporations Act, upon
which the Montana corporate governance law is based. Further, the influential American
Law Institute, in its Principles of Corporate Governance has also recognized these two duties. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PARTS
IV AND V, at 171-497 (Tent. Draft. No. 11, April 25. 1991) [hereinafter A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (referring to the duty of loyalty as the duty of fair dealing).
As I will define duties broadly, duties such as obedience and candor are subsumed
within the duties of care and loyalty.
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ficers violated their duty of care to the corporation and whether
their conduct is protected by the business judgment rule. Second,
courts should scrutinize whether directors, officers and controlling
shareholders violated their duty of loyalty by personally profiting
from their relationship with the corporation, at the expense of the
corporation. Finally, for close corporations, courts must analyze
whether directors and others in control of the corporation oppressed minority shareholders by violating the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders. The new legislation provides guidance to courts in defining and applying each of these duties.
A.

Statutory Changes to the Duty of Care

The new legislation continued the prior law's tradition of statutorily defining the directors' duty of care. The drafters of the law
specifically resisted the temptation to codify the elusive and related business judgment rule because courts need the flexibility
provided by the business judgment rule in applying the duty of
care to directors. The legislation did, however, clarify the duty of
care by expressly charging officers with the same duties as
directors.
1. Definition of the Duty of Care and the Business Judgment
Rule
The duty of care requires a director to act carefully in discharging his or her task of monitoring and managing the affairs of
the corporation. The new law's definition of the duty of care is
similar to that of the previous legislation. The new legislation
provides:
General standards for directors. (1) A director shall discharge
his duties as a director, including the director's duties as a member of a committee:
(a) in good faith;
(b) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a similar
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(c) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation.20
As a general rule, courts have recognized that while directors
ought to exercise due care in making decisions, they must also have
some latitude to innovate and to take risks. 2 If directors are subMONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-418(1) (1991).
21. Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 202 Mont. 260, 273, 658 P.2d 1071, 1078 (1983) ("directors of a commercial corporation may take chances"). See also, Daniels v. Thomas, Dean &

20.
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jected to the scrutiny of 20/20 hindsight, directors may hesitate to
take the risks that entrepreneurs must take. To minimize this risk,
courts have developed a judicial gloss to the duty of care referred
to as the business judgment rule. Those drafting the legislation
neither attempted to define the business judgment rule nor to impinge on the court's latitude to define the rule.
The business judgment rule has been discussed in two recent
Montana cases, Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall2" and Daniels v.
Thomas, Dean and Hoskins, Inc.2 3 In the first of these cases, Ski
Roundtop, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the following as a
statement of the business judgment rule: "[T]he 'business judgment rule' immunizes management from liability in a corporate
transaction undertaken within both the power of the corporation
and the authority of management where there is a reasonable basis
to indicate that the transaction was made in good faith."2' 4 The
business judgment rule described in this case appears to use a subjective good faith standard to evaluate directors' conduct. The subjective standard is satisfied when a court decides that the actual
motivation of the director is to serve the corporation. An objective
standard, on the other hand, does not focus on the actual motivation of the director; instead it asks whether a director acted as an
ordinarily prudent person in the management of his or her own
business affairs. The subjective standard focuses on actual intent;
the objective standard measures the directors' conduct against the
conduct of others. In Ski Roundtop, the Montana Supreme Court
emphasized the subjective standard when it stated:
Because [directors] are given this wide latitude, the law will not
hold directors liable for honest errors, for mistakes of judgment,
when they act without corrupt motive and in good faith, that is,
for mistakes which may properly be classified under the heading
of honest mistakes. And that is true even though the errors may
be so gross that they may demonstrate the unfitness of the directors to manage the corporate affairs.2
More recently, in Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., the
court seemed to shift its focus to an objective standard:
Hoskins, Inc., 246 Mont. 125, 139, 804 P.2d 359, 367 (1990) ("Judges are not business experts and therefore should not substitute their judgment for the judgment of the
directors").
22. 202 Mont. 260, 658 P.2d 1071 (1983).
23. 246 Mont. 125, 804 P.2d 359 (1990).
24. 202 Mont. at 273, 658 P.2d at 1078 (quoting Nursing Home Bldg. Corp. v. DeHart,
13 Wash. App. 489, 498, 535 P.2d 137, 143-44 (1975)).
25. 202 Mont. at 273, 658 P.2d at 1078 (quoting 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039, at 45 (rev. perm. ed. 1986)).
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This Court recognized that when a reasonable basis exists to indicate that directors of a corporation acted in good faith, the directors are immunized from liability for honest errors [citation omitted]. Daniels failed to offer proof that Thomas' actions were
unreasonable in that they would not have been taken by 'an ordinarily prudent man . . . in the management of his own affairs of
like magnitude and importance.' 6
The Corporate Law Revision Committee did not attempt to
codify either a subjective or objective business judgment rule.2 7 No
states have codified this complex rule, and judicial interpretations
of the rule vary. s
Some latitude for the courts is desirable. For example, in some
cases there is ample evidence of the subjective good faith, or lack
thereof. In other cases, there is little or no evidence bearing on
subjective good faith, but ample evidence is available against
which courts may evaluate objective good faith. Courts need the
flexibility to apply a standard which is most judicious. As a result,
the legislation permits the statutory duty of care to continue to
coexist with the judicially created business judgment rule.
Perhaps the best statement of the business judgment rule is a
blending of the objective standard of Daniels and the subjective

standard of Ski Roundtop. The drafters of the A.L.I.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

PRINCIPLES OF

have stated the rule as follows:

• . . (c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment
in good faith fulfills his duty under this section if:
(1) he is not interested . . . in the subject of his business
judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business
judgment to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate
under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation.29
The words "rationally believe" direct courts to examine a direc26. 246 Mont. at 139, 804 P.2d at 367 (quoting Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co, 341 F.
Supp. 240, 244 (D. Neb. 1972)).
27. The drafters of the RMBCA, in an early draft, attempted to codify the business
judgment rule. REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30 at 933 (1984-91) [hereinafter ABA
OFFICIAL COMMENTS]. The drafters recognized that "the scope of the 'business judgment
rule' [is] among the most difficult and controversial issues in corporation law today." Id.
After receiving numerous objections to the proposal, it was decided that definition of the
business judgment rule was "too complex to be handled as part of the broad revision process
and ... should be left to continuing judicial interpretation and development." Id. at 933-34.
28. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, § 4.01(c) comment, at
223.
29. Id. at § 4.01(c) comment, at 223-24.
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tor's subjective beliefs. Not all subjective beliefs, however, are protected from judicial scrutiny. The word "rationally" establishes a
limit on the range of acceptable subjective beliefs. Those limits are
to be determined by an objective standard of what the reasonable
person in a like position might do under similar circumstances.
The business judgment rule serves to create a presumption
that the directors acted in good faith and on an informed basis.
The Delaware Superior Court accurately describes the business
judgment rule as "a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the
best interests of the company."3 According to the Delaware Superior Court, "the party attacking a board decision as an uninformed
one must rebut the 'presumption' that its business judgment was
an informed one." 3 ' Judgments by the directors, though mistaken,
are protected if the directors were informed and not grossly negligent.32' A director's judgment is grossly negligent if the director's
conduct is either without reason, in deliberate disregard of the interest of shareholders or recklessly indifferent to their interests. 33
The new legislation continues to allow corporations to limit
the liability of directors for a violation of the duty of care.3 Basically, the new law allows shareholders, through a statement in the
articles of incorporation, to waive their right to make a claim for
most breaches of the duty of care. Permitting this type of waiver
allows shareholders to opt out of the statutory and judicial
schemes governing the duty of care. However, under the new law,
30. Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
31. 1d. See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). See also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19 § 4.01 comment, at 184: "Courts, when
applying the business judgment rule, have often stated that a 'presumption' exists in favor
of the propriety or regularity of the actions of the directors and officers. This correctly signifies that no inference of dereliction of duty can or should be drawn from the fact, for example, that a corporation has suffered a business reversal."
32. Smith, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
33. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986).
34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216 (1991) provides in part:
(2) The articles of incorporation may set forth:
(d) a provision eliminating or limiting the liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders for money damages for any actions taken or any failure
to take any action, as a director, except liability for:
(i) the amount of a financial benefit received by a director to which the director is not entitled;
(ii) an intentional infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders;
(iii) a violation of 35-1-713; or
(iv) an intentional violation of criminal law.
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shareholders may not waive their right to recover if the directors'
actions amount to an "intentional infliction of harm." The previous law prohibits limitations on director liabilities if the actions
amount to "willful misconduct, recklessness, or a knowing violation
of law."'35 The Committee wanted to afford the directors reasonable predictability. The new statute is more precise in that terms
from the previous statute such as "recklessness" are less capable of
determination than the "intentional infliction of harm" standard
found in the new statute.
2.

Applicability of Duty of Care to Officers

Unlike the previous statute, the new legislation expressly extends the duty of care obligation to officers. 36 The duties of care of
directors and of officers, as defined by this statute, are now identical. The new statute, however, probably does not change the law.
The Montana Supreme Court has quoted approvingly from legal
treatises that state that officers also have a duty of care.3 7 Officers,
as agents of the corporation," are also in a relationship of trust
with the corporation. As such, the officers likewise ought to be subject to a duty of care.
The new legislation does not permit officers of a corporation to
benefit from provisions in the articles of incorporation limiting
§ 35-1-202(2)(a)(v)(B) (1989).
§ 35-1-443 (1991).
37. Ski Roundtop, Inc., 202 Mont. at 273, 658 P.2d at 1078, quoting what is now 3A
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039, at 45 (rev. perm.
ed. 1986 & Supp. 1991). ("It is too well settled to admit of controversy that ordinarily
neither the directors nor the officers of a corporation are liable for mere mistakes or errors
of judgment, either of law or fact.") Not all courts agree, however, that the business judgment rule and the duty of care apply to officers. Platt v. Richardson, 1989 W.L. 159584
(M.D. Pa. June 9, 1989.) ("The business judgment rule applies only to directors of a corporation and not to officers.") But see Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch.
1971) ("the decision of executive officers may also come within the [Business Judgment]
Rule").
The Comments to the American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance also
make the observation that the officers' and directors' duties of care are virtually identical:
Although most precedents and statutory provisions deal solely with directors, it is
relatively well settled that officers will be held to the same duty of care and business judgment standards as directors. Sound public policy points in this direction,
as does the little case authority that exists, statutory precedents in at least eighteen states, and the views of most commentators.
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, § 4.01 comment, at 179.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 14C comment b, at 66 (1958) ("In these
cases,... [an officer is] necessarily an agent, and normally a general agent, of the corporation, since he acts on its behalf and subject to its control exercised through the board of
directors").
35.

MONT. CODE ANN.

36.

MONT. CODE ANN.
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their own liability. Some states do extend this benefit to officers.3 9
The Committee decided not to permit limitations on the liability
of officers because their function is not as discretionary as directors.40 Officers are subject to more specific direction from directors
than directors are from shareholders. As such, their duties and obligations are clearer than those of directors. Furthermore, officers
are more likely to serve as employees, receiving a salary. Because
they receive salaries, they are more likely to serve without the benefit of limitations of liability. Officers, the Committee decided, are
best protected from liabilities by the indemnification provisions of
the statute.'
B.

Statutory Changes to the Duty of Loyalty

The second major duty of directors and officers is the duty of
loyalty. Broadly stated, a duty of loyalty is a duty to act solely for
the benefit of the corporation in all matters that come before
them. The duty prohibits undue personal profit at the expense of
the corporation. The classic statement of the directors' duty of loy2
alty is found in the Delaware case of Guth v. Loft, Inc.4
The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty
and self-interest. The occasions for the determination of honesty,
good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no hard
and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale.
The duty of loyalty encompasses at least five subduties:
1.The duty not to "unduly profit individually" or through a
related party from a transaction with the corporation.' 3
2.The duty to avoid causing the corporation to pay oneself excess compensation."
3.The duty to use corporate property, material, nonpublic corporate information and corporate position only for the benefit of
5
the corporation.4
4.The duty to avoid profiting from corporate opportunities.',
39. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1991).
40. In the event a person serves as both an officer and director, courts must determine
in which capacity the person made the alleged misjudgment to determine whether the person's liability is limited by the corporation's articles.
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-457 (1991).
42. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
43. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at § 5.02 and § 5.07.
44. Id. at § 5.03.
45. Id. at § 5.04.
46. Id. at § 5.05. ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, at § 8.58, at 1142.6-1142.7.
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5.The duty to refrain from competing with the corporation.' 7
Montana statutes have been largely silent as to the specific
duties of loyalty of officers and directors. An exception are those
statutes relating to "conflict of interest" transactions between the
corporation and the directors or parties related to directors. The
previous law included a general statement that certain conflict of
interest transactions are "void or voidable."'48 The statute was unclear as to the exact meaning of "void or voidable" and what action, if any, was required to effectively void a contract. Under the
previous law, contracts existed which, unbeknownst to parties relying on them, may be void or voidable. The realities of the business
world and the need for certainty in business contracts and transactions dictated a change in the "void or voidable" standard.
The new legislation increases certainty about conflict of interest transactions by adopting a bright line approach. The legislation
clearly defines "conflict-of-interest transactions" by identifying
which contracts between parties are considered to be between related parties. 4' The legislation also eliminates any references to
"void or voidable" contracts. Instead the legislation provides specific rules governing when contracts may be set aside or enjoined.50
Contracts or transactions which are otherwise considered conflictof-interest transactions, may not be subject to judicial intervention
if approved by disinterested shareholders or disinterested directors
or are judged to have been fair to the corporation."
The conflict-of-interest provisions in the new legislation have
two notable limitations. First, the legislation does not provide a
"laundry list" of all possible types of director violations of the duty
of care (e.g., misappropriation of a corporate opportunity). Instead,
the statute relies on the courts and case law to continue to identify
47. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at § 5.06.
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-413 (1989).
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-461(1) & (2) (1991). The new statute defines a related
party as:
(a) the spouse or a parent or sibling of a spouse of the director;
(b) a child, grandchild, sibling, parent or spouse of any child, grandchild, sibling, or parent of the director;
(c) an individual having the same residence as the director;
(d) a trust or estate of which an individual ... [that] is a substantial beneficiary; or
(e) a trust, estate, incompetent person, conservatee, or minor for whom the
director is a fiduciary.
Id. at (3).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462 (1991).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-462(2) (1991).
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the full extent of the duty of loyalty. The Committee believed that
any attempt to develop a "laundry list" of the subduties to the
duty of loyalty would risk excluding some actions which courts
should have the flexibility to deem unacceptable. Courts can often
apply the principles of the new statute governing conflict-of-interest transactions to other breaches of the duty of loyalty. Usually if
a director makes full disclosure and disinterested directors or
shareholders approve of the transaction, the transaction does not
2
violate the duty of loyalty.
The second limitation is that the provisions of the statute deal
only with director conflict-of-interest.8 3 Conflicts-of-interest involving officers of the corporation are not specifically addressed.
Because officers are agents, the rules of agency (as well as employer
policy) should serve to define the acceptable limits of conduct. Although the duty of directors does not, by statute, ' 4 necessarily apply to officers, the general rules concerning the directors' duty of
fair dealing are helpful in analyzing the officers' duties. The American Law Institute, in its Principles of Corporate Governance, has
adopted this approach by recognizing that the duty of loyalty is
equally applicable to officers (senior executives) and directors. 5
C.

Controlling Shareholders' and Directors' Duty to Avoid
Illegal, Oppressive and Fraudulent Conduct

The duty most significantly changed by the new legislation is'
the duty of controlling shareholders' and directors' to avoid oppressive conduct. The new legislation provides additional weapons
for minority shareholders seeking to realize their reasonable
expectations.
The controlling shareholder's and director's duty to avoid conduct that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent is addressed by both
the previous statute 56 and the new statute.17 In one sense, the reference to "oppression" buried in the statute is a state legislative
acorn grown into a judicial oak, 8 because it is the primary remedy
available to minority shareholders to combat oppression.
52.
53.

54.

ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, at § 8.58 at 1142.7.
Id. § 8.58, at 1142.5 (1991).
MONT. COnE ANN. § 35-1-461(2) (1991).
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, at

§ 5.01, at 267.
35-1-921 (1989).
57.
35-1-938(1) (1991).
58. Perhaps the best known reference to a legislative acorn growing into a judicial oak
is the reference to Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 found in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/1
55.

56.
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The Plight of Minority Shareholders

The growth in the number of shareholder dissension cases in
the last several decades has been called "phenomenal." 5 9 In' Montana alone, the state supreme court has decided five major cases
within the last dozen years." The number of oppression cases is
not surprising. As close corporations are handed from the founders
to their successors, the cohesiveness that the founders bring to the
business is often lost. The successors often have divergent goals for
the business."1 Given the preponderance of close corporations in
Montana, developing a procedure to resolve shareholder oppression
sensibly was a critical task of the drafting committee.
In order to fashion an appropriate statutory provision addressing corporate dissension, it is necessary to understand its cause.

The primary cause of corporate dissension is illiquidity of the interest of minority shareholders. 2 Shareholders in publicly held
corporations have the option of selling their stock on an organized

stock market if they become dissatisfied, but shareholders in close
corporations" do not have that luxury.
The plight of a minority shareholder in a close corporation was
of particular concern in drafting the new legislation. Typically, the
close corporation is a family-owned corporation." Often one or
more of the parents founding the corporation have died. One or
59.

Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits As a Remedy for

Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 87 (1987) (citing F. O'NEAL

AND

R.

THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS at iii (2d ed. 1985)). One author concludes that "[clonflicts between the interests of controlling and minority shareholders in
stock corporations have been and continue to be a major-perhaps the single most important-problem in corporation law." Hetherington, Defining the Scope of Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 9, 9 (1987).
60. Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 246 Mont. 125, 804 P.2d 359 (1990);
Gray v. Harris Land & Cattle Co., 227 Mont. 51, 737 P.2d 475 (1987); Maddox v. Norman,
206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929
(1982); Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
61. For a discussion of costs associated with shareholder oppression, see Bahls, Resolving ShareholderDissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L.
285, 287 (1990).
62. Bahls, supra note 61, at 288-93.
63. A close corporation is any business corporation without a ready market for the
corporation's stock. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS,
§ 2.15, at 2-38 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1991). The Montana Supreme Court focuses on the
relationship between management and ownership in its definition: "a close corporation is
one in which management and ownership are 'substantially identical to the extent that it is
unrealistic to believe that the judgment of directors will be independent of that of the stockholders'." Thisted v. Tower Mgmt. Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 14, 409 P.2d 813, 820 (1966) (quoting
Symposium, The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U. L. REV. 345, 345 (1957)).
64. Family-owned businesses represent ninety-five percent of all businesses in the
United
States. J. WARD,
KEEPING THE FAMILY BUSINESS HEALTHY XV (1987).
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more of the children frequently operate the business, assuming the
position of the formerly dominant parent in the business. Other
children have subservient roles in the business or choose employment outside the business. As the sense of obligation to the founders to avoid dissension among the successors fades, the divergent
goals of the successors create conflict. Those successors most active
in the business often perceive that those less active are unduly
benefiting from the more active shareholders' efforts.
Minority shareholders find that several of their expectations
are often violated. Among the expectations most often violated are:
1) that the majority shareholders will negotiate fairly with the
minority shareholders;5

2) that the minority may participate in management;"6
3) that the majority shareholders will cause the corporation to
consent to a reasonable valuation of stock for a shareholder wish67
ing to retire;
4) payment of dividends or other distributions, if sufficient
earnings exist; 68

5) the expectation that those in control of the corporation will
not use the corporate assets as if they were their own or receive a
profit from the corporation in violation of the controlling shareholders' duty of care. 9
Shareholders whose reasonable expectations are ignored by
those in control have relatively few alternatives. Unlike shareholders in a publicly held corporation, they are unable to sell their
stock on an organized market. In addition, even if the minority
shareholder could find someone interested in investing in a close
corporation, those investors are not usually interested in buying
65. See, e.g., Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 246 Mont. 125, 140-41, 804
P.2d 359, 367-68 (1990).
66. See, e.g., Kelly v. Rudd, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 24 (Jan. 26, 1992); Sawyer v.
Curt & Co., 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 117 (Jan. 31, 1991); Pedro v. Pedro, 463 N.W.2d 285,
288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 213, 645 P.2d 929, 935
(1982); Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 192 Mont. 505, 517, 629 P.2d 214, 221 (1981); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 104 N.M. 523, 529, 724 P.2d 232, 238 (1986); In re
Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 63-64, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805
(1984); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center Co., 108 A.D.2d 81, 84, 487 N.Y.S.2d 901,
903 (1985); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (1980).
67. See, e.g. Daniels, at 140-41, 804 P.2d at 367-68; Skierka v. Skierka Bros., Inc., 192
Mont. 505, 517, 629 P.2d 214, 220 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 533 (M.D. N.C. 1988);
Corbin v. Corbin, 429 F. Supp. 276 (M.D. Ga. 1977); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont.
201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484
N.Y.S.2d 799 (1984).
69. See, e.g. Maddox v. Norman, 206 Mont. 1, 13, 669 P.2d 230, 236 (1983).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/1

16

Bahls: Montana's New Business Corporation Act
19921

BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT

into a corporation where minority shareholders' reasonable expectations are disregarded. Usually, the only buyer available is the
corporation itself or the oppressive shareholders controlling the
corporation. Because they are already in control and the costs associated with dealing with minority shareholders are minimal, the
controlling shareholders have little incentive to purchase the
70
shares of the minority.
The duty to avoid oppression of minority shareholders is separate from the duty of care and loyalty.7 1 The directors' duty of care
tests whether he or she acted in good faith and as a prudent director would act. The duty of loyalty is measured by examining
whether the director benefitted at the expense of the corporation.
However, the duty to avoid oppression is measured by the reasonable expectations of shareholders.7 2 For example, a board of directors might decide in a family farm corporation that a sister who
leaves the farm should be removed from the board and should not
receive any financial return. These same directors might also take
steps to freeze their sister out of participation in management and
profits. The decision to remove the sister from the board might
survive the business judgment rule if the directors acted in good
faith. Under the business judgment rule directors could justify a
freeze-out by arguing that it is best for business to keep the profits
in the corporation and reward those who stay on the farm. The
decision might also satisfy the duty of loyalty because there was no
demonstrable transaction in which the directors personally profited. However, the conduct is unlikely to satisfy the duty to meet
the reasonable expectations of shareholders, who reasonably expect
some opportunity to participate in the management and profits of
a successful family farm.
70. See Bahls, supra note 61, at 291-92.
71. See, e.g., ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27 § 8.58, at 1142.5.
72. F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.30, at 9-141 to 149 (3d 1983);
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH.
U.L.Q. 193 (1988); Clifford, Close Corporation Shareholder Reasonable Expectations: The
Larger Context, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41 (1987); Hillman, Indissoluble Partnerships,37
U. FLA. L. REv. 691 (1985). See also Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985);
Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377 (Iowa App. 1988); Pedro v. Pedro, 463
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 117 (Jan.
31, 1991); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
Inc., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (1979), aff'd 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994
(1980), cert. denied 85 N.J. 112, 425 A.2d 273 (1980); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son,
Inc., 104 N.M. 523, 724 P.2d 232 (1986); In re Rambusch, 143 A.D. 2d 605, 533 N.Y.S.2d 423
(1988); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1984); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 164 W.
241, 262 S.E.2d at
433
(1980).
Published Va.
by ScholarWorks
University
of Montana, 1992
17

Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 1

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

Montana law should recognize a duty not to oppress shareholders in a closely held corporation that is separate from the duties of care and loyalty. Close corporations, by their very nature, do
not provide shareholders with a market for their shares. Remedies
for oppressed shareholders in a close corporation are easily frustrated by two doctrines: the majority rules doctrine and the business judgment rule.73 If those in control of the corporation are able
to use the majority rules doctrine to justify all decisions, minority
shareholders will have virtually no rights. If the majority decides
that the original shared expectations no longer suit them, they may
use the majority rules doctrine as a sword to cut off the rights of
the minority. Similarly, courts should not apply the business judgment rule as a defense in oppression cases. The business judgment
rule is a valid defense only if the decisionmaker-defendant is "not
interested" in the transaction."4 Usually, efforts to force out a minority shareholder are a result of the majority's self interest. Likewise, the business judgment rule creates thorny problems of proof
for disempowered minority shareholders. As such, in close corporations, the conduct of the majority should not only withstand the
business judgment rule, but satisfy the reasonable expectations of
shareholders.
Protection of reasonable expectations is not a new concept; it
is well founded in the law:
Although court intervention to protect the reasonable expectations of shareholders is still evolving, the doctrine of protecting
reasonable expectations has been termed 'near the center of the
legal universe.' Contract law protects the reasonable expectations
of parties to contracts, property law defines and protects expectations of those who own property, tort law allocates risks partially
based on reasonable expectations, and the law of fiduciary obligations also requires the person owing the obligation to fulfill the
reasonable expectations of the other."
Not all minority shareholder expectations are reasonable. Subjective hopes and desires that are not reasonable are not protected. 76 Courts, for example, have held that it is not reasonable
for a part-time employee-shareholder who "apparently contributed
little, if anything," to the business to expect continued employ73. See F. O'NEIL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3.03, at
4-5 (3d ed. 1991).
74. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE supra note 19, § 4.01(c)(1), at 178.
75. Bahls, supra note 61, at 322.
76. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 73, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484
N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984).
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ment and associated benefits. 7 Reasonable expectations are usually those recognized by all shareholders at the time they formed
the business or those they mutually consented to from the start.
Expectations are reasonable when they are known and become part
of the basis of operation or continued operation of the business.7 8
Recent Montana Supreme Court cases which limit bad faith
actions should not diminish the statutory protection given to minority shareholders. These recent Montana cases reduced the protection courts give to other types of expectations by significantly
reducing the ability of plaintiffs to recover tort damages for a
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In
Story v. City of Bozeman,"' the Montana Supreme Court recognized the continued importance of protecting expectations," but
limited the plaintiff's ability to obtain tort damages for a violation
of reasonable expectations arising from contract. The Story case,
then, should not serve to diminish the protection of the reasonable
expectations of minority shareholders.81 Courts are authorized not
by tort law, but by legislation, 2 to use their equitable powers to
77. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 634-35, 507 P.2d 387, 39697 (1973).
78. For a discussion of how to determine which expectations are reasonable, whether
expectations change over time and how to determine the reasonable expectations of shareholders admitted after the business is formed, see Bahls, supra note 53, at 325-27.
79. 242 Mont. 436, 791 P.2d 767 (1990).
80. Id. at 450, 791 P.2d at 775. "Each party to a contract has a justified expectation
that the other will act in a reasonable manner." Id.
81. Id. at 447-50, 791 P.2d at 774-75. "This Court affixed tort damages against the
defendant noting that each party to a contract has a justifiable expectation that the other
will act in a reasonable manner in performance or efficient breach of the contract. When one
party used its discretion to arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably deprive the other party
of the benefit of the contract, those expectations were violated .... In the typical contract
case the Nicholson reasoning is still sound, but the Nicholson tort remedy is excessive." Id.
82. The Montana legislature, for example, enacted MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938
(1991), permitting courts to dissolve a corporation if those in control oppressed those not in
control. In 1987, the legislature also adopted the Montana Close Corporation Act (the
"MCCA"). See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-101 to -504 (1991). See generally Bahls and Quist,
The ABA Model Statutory Close CorporationAct: A New Opportunityfor 'Made in Mon-

tana' Corporations, 49 MONT. L. REV. 66 (1988). The benefits of the MCCA apply only to
those corporations electing its coverage. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9-103 (1991). The MCCA
provides that a court may use its full range of equitable powers to intervene when "directors
or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is
illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial ..
" MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-9501(1)(a) (1991). The court may remedy these problems by taking one of a number of actions: setting aside a wrongful action, removing a director, appointing a custodian, ordering
the payment of dividends, ordering a share purchase or dissolving the corporation. MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-9-502 through 504 (1991).
Unfortunately, a small minority of corporations have elected the benefits of the MCCA.
Telephone conversation with Garth Jacobson, attorney for the Secretary of State (Dec. 10,
1991).
The author speculates
that of
theMontana,
primary reason
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resolve shareholder oppression. The Story court recognized that it
is important to "discourage oppression" when the parties are in
unequal positions and when one places trust in the other.8 3 Minority shareholders are in a fiduciary relationship with majority shareholders. If courts do not intervene to protect reasonable expectations, minority shareholders are likely to suffer recurring
oppression at the hands of those in control.
2. Montana Case
Corporations

Law

Addressing

Oppression in

Close

Over the years Montana courts have attempted to level the
playing field by allowing minority shareholders in close corporations to petition courts for relief when majority shareholders act
oppressively. In Thisted v. Tower Management Corp.,8 4 the Montana Supreme Court recognized that "intracorporate problems
arising in a close corporation demand the unusual and extraordinary remedies available only in a court of equity. 8' 5 Courts of equity will grant relief "when, in view of all of the circumstances, to
deny it would permit one of the parties to suffer a gross wrong at
the hands of the other party who brought about the condition." 8
The Montana Supreme Court applied the rationale of Thisted
to a dispute involving a family-owned corporation in Skierka v.
Skierka Bros., Inc.8 7 In Skierka, a widow and her daughter filed
suit against her brother-in-law who was in control of the corporation. The plaintiffs alleged, and the district court agreed, that the
following actions amounted to oppression:
1) fixing an unfair stock valuation at which minority shareholders may sell.
2) carrying on the business without consulting the other
shareholders.
3) failing to create an executive vice presidency for a minority shareholder with power equal to that of a majority
shareholder.
iarity with the MCCA and questions of whether a corporation incorporated under the
MCCA will be treated as a corporation or partnership for income tax purposes. A recent
position taken by the Internal Revenue Service seems to clarify the tax issue. The IRS has
adopted a "per se rule" that no incorporated entity (presumably including a Montana Statutory Close Corporation) may be taxed as a partnership. Letter from Barbara C. Spudis to
the ABA Subcommittee on Limited Liability Companies 3 (Dec. 7, 1990) (describing a meeting between the subcommittee and representatives of the IRS).
83. 242 Mont. at 451, 791 P.2d at 776.
84. 147 Mont. 1, 409 P.2d 813 (1966).
85. Id. at 14, 409 P.2d at 820.
86. Id. at 15, 409 P.2d at 821.
87. 192 Mont. 505, 629 P.2d 214 (1981).
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4) excluding the minority shareholders from "any part or
voice in the operation .
except for participation in the annual
meeting." 8
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the district court decision even though the district court did not find any violation of
contractual rights. Additionally, the court refused to permit the
controlling shareholder's conduct on the theory that the controlling shareholders owned more stock than the plaintiff. The court
implicitly recognized that the "majority rules" doctrine must not
permit majority shareholders to oppress minority shareholders.
In Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co.,89 the Montana Supreme Court
more clearly defined the obligations of majority shareholders to
minority shareholders. The court, relying on the work of the late
Professor F. Hodge O'Neal, defined oppression as the violation of
the reasonable expectations of the shareholders.9 0 The reasonable
expectation standard adopted by the Montana Supreme Court is
consistenf with the standard adopted in other states.9 1 In Fox, the
court held that the majority shareholder violated the reasonable
expectations of minority shareholders. The court specifically found
the majority shareholder's failure to cause the corporation to pay
dividends, when combined with depriving the minority shareholders "of any voice in management,"9 2 amounted to a plan to squeeze
out minority shareholders.
The court found that the "most persuasive consideration" justifying application of its equitable power was that the relationship
between close corporation shareholders is akin to that of partners. 3 In essence, the court found a fiduciary duty that extended
beyond the typical duties of a corporation to a shareholder. The
88. Id. at 517, 629 P.2d at 220.
89. 198 Mont. 201, 645 P.2d 929 (1982).
90. Id. at 209, 645 P.2d at 933. For a further discussion of the violation of reasonable
expectations as a basis for relief, see F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.30,
at 9-141 to 9-145 (3d ed. 1988). See also Thompson, CorporateDissolution of Shareholders'
Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 193 (1988).

91. Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985); Maschmeier v. Southside
Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa App. 1988); McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son,
Inc., 104 N.M. 523, 528, 724 P.2d 232, 237 (1986); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63,
73, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 805 (1984); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 34,
433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (1980); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 289, 307 S.E.2d 551,
558 (1983); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987); Masinter v. WEBCO Co.,
164 W. Va. 241, 254, 262 S.E.2d 433, 441 (1980).
92. Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 198 Mont. 201, 205, 645 P.2d 929, 931 (1892). The court
also found that the majority shareholder violated his duties by causing the corporation to
lease properties to a related corporation he controlled for less than fair market value. Id. at
211, 645 P.2d at 934.
93. Id. at 212, 645 P.2d at 935.
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court did not rely on a breach of contract analysis or a "majority
rules" analysis, but relied upon a breach of fiduciary duties.
The court in Fox also addressed the failure to pay dividends.
Courts have traditionally been hesitant to order the payment of
dividends. The traditional standard to test whether dividends
should be paid is the "abuse of discretion" standard."' Typically,
abuse of discretion requires a finding of fraud or bad faith. 5 The
court rejected these traditional standards in favor of the more progressive "reasonable expectation standard."
Just one year later, in Maddox v. Norman,9 6 the Montana Supreme Court seemed to place less emphasis on the reasonable expectation standard. In this case, minority shareholders alleged that
the dominant shareholder in a ranching corporation misapplied
and wasted funds. Specifically, the minority shareholder alleged
that the majority shareholder did not inform her that her father
had given her stock until nine years after the gift."7 During this
time period she was not given the opportunity to participate in
management and did not receive information about the corporation." The corporation failed to keep separate records99 and the
proceeds of a corporate loan were used to repay a loan on property
titled in the majority shareholder's name.100 The record was replete
with financial irregularities, including loans between the corporation and majority shareholder that were not documented.0 1 Likewise, proceeds of the sale of calves and crops and rental income
from corporate property were deposited in the bank accounts of
0 2
the majority shareholders.1
The Montana Supreme Court refused to overrule the district
court's denial of the plaintiff's request to liquidate. The district
court held that, "although defendants' conduct was not per forma
as to corporate law or the corporation's by-laws, 'its informality
was not oppressive toward the plaintiff, nor was she defrauded.' ,,103 The district court did not explicitly test the control94. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 327, at 913 (1983).
95. Id. at 914.
96. 206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
97. Id. at 5, 669 P.2d at 232.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 5-6, 669 P.2d at 233.
101. Id. at 6-7, 669 P.2d at 233.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 9, 669 P.2d at 234. It is unclear whether the Maddox court affirmed the
district court finding of no oppression. A subsequent Montana Supreme Court case, however, stated that the court in Maddox did affirm "the district court's conclusion in Maddox
of denying liquidation." Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 246 Mont. 125, 141, 804
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ling shareholders' conduct against the reasonable expectations
standard. Instead, it simply stated that the plaintiff had not
"demonstrated underlying
equities which demand the harsh liqui10 4
remedy.
dation
The Maddox court, however, did require the corporation to
purchase the interest of the minority shareholder against her will.
Relying on its general equitable power (as distinguished from its
statutory authorization to liquidate), 10 5 the court found that it had
the power to order sales of stock, when shareholders were "unable
to cooperate" in management. 0 6
Recently, the Montana Supreme Court seemed to retreat further from the fiduciary duty and reasonable expectations analysis.
In Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc.,"0 7 a minority shareholder sued on both a breach of fiduciary duty theory and a corporate oppression theory. The shareholders alleged that:
1) the majority shareholder induced the minority shareholder
to leave his employment on representations he would receive 100%
10 8
of the "fair value" for his stock;
2) the majority shareholder used "hardball" negotiation tactics in negotiating for the purchase of stock, including failing to
disclose important information and threatening to "bleed the assets" from the corporation if there was not a settlement favorable
to the corporation. 0 9
In analyzing the plaintiff's fiduciary duty claim the court reiterated that shareholders in a close corporation are akin to partners."1 The court correctly noted that the controlling shareholders
have a duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty.""' The court further held that the fiduciary duty was owed to "all of the shareholders," not only to the minority shareholder. 2 The court reasoned
that courts are not business experts and should not ordinarily substitute their judgment for that of the directors. Justice Barz, writing for the majority, concluded that "when a reasonable basis exists to indicate that the directors of a corporation acted in good
faith, the directors are immunized from liability for honest
P.2d 359, 368 (1990).
104. Maddox, 206 Mont. at 13, 669 P.2d at 236.
105. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921 (1989).
106. Maddox, 206 Mont. at 16, 669 P.2d at 238.
107. 246 Mont. 125, 804 P.2d 359 (1990).
108. Id. at 135, 804 P.2d at 365.
109. Id. at 139-40, 804 P.2d at 367-68.
110. Id. at 136, 804 P.2d at 366.
111. Id. at 137, 804 P.2d at 366 (quoting Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975)).
112. Daniels, at 137, 804 P.2d at 366.
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errors."11 3
The court also analyzed minority shareholders' claims that the
acts of the majority shareholder constituted oppression. The minority shareholders' strongest argument was that the corporation's
agents, when negotiating a buyout on favorable terms, threatened
to "bleed the assets from the corporation" if the minority did not
succumb to their demands. The court rejected this claim stating
categorically: "Possible future oppressive actions are not sufficient
to invoke" the court's power to liquidate the corporation under
theories of oppression.1"1'
The court's analysis in Daniels, although citing Skierka and
Fox, seems to be a retreat from the reasonable expectations standard. The court focuses not on the reasonable expectations of the
minority, but whether the majority has acted with a legitimate
business purpose. The change in focus from the expectations of the
shareholders to whether there is a legitimate business reason is
troublesome because it seems to confuse the controlling shareholders' duty to avoid oppression with the directors' duties of care.
In the Daniels decision, the court may have succumbed to the
temptation to decide cases involving dissension in close corporations by applying the majority rule doctrine and the business judgment rule. In the Daniels decision, those in control of the corporation threatened to "bleed the assets" from the corporation if the
minority did not accept the majority's offer for his stock.11 5 The
court allowed this conduct, in part because of the protections afforded by the business judgment rule 1 and in part because of the
majority rules doctrine." 7 As previously discussed, the proper standard is whether the reasonable expectations of the shareholders
1 18
have been violated.
In the Daniels case, the court also confused the standard necessary to satisfy the duty of loyalty with the standard necessary to
satisfy the duty of care. When analyzing whether the duty of loy113. Id. at 139, 804 P.2d at 367.
114. Id. at 141, 804 P.2d at 368.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 137-38, 804 P.2d at 366. "However, the controlling group should not be
stymied by a minority stockholder's grievances if the controlling group can demonstrate a
legitimate business purpose and the minority stockholder cannot demonstrate a less harmful
alternative." Id.
117. Id. at 138, 804 P.2d at 367 (controlling shareholders' duties to "all of the shareholders") (emphasis in original).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78. See also Bahls, supra note 61, at 32027; Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66
WASH. U.L.Q. 193, 214 (1988); Clifford, Close CorporationShareholderReasonable Expectations: The Larger Context, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 42 (1987).
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alty of those in control of the corporation had been satisfied, the
court correctly cited such cases as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co." 9 The duty of loyalty provides that those in control must not
"act out of avarice, expediency or self interest" in degradation of
their duty to the corporation or its shareholders. 2 ' The Montana
Supreme Court then stated that "the controlling group should not
be stymied by a minority stockholder's grievance if the controlling
group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose and the minority stockholder cannot demonstrate a less harmful alternative."' 2 1 The defense of "legitimate business purpose" is also
known as the business judgment rule defense.' 2 2 Satisfying the
business judgment rule is a defense against the duty of care, not a
defense against the duty of loyalty. 2 ' Additionally, the business
judgment rule does not apply to those transactions where the director has a personal interest. 2 4
3. Impact of New Legislation
The new legislation makes significant changes in the law concerning the duty of majority shareholders to avoid oppression of
minority shareholders. It changes the threshold standards defining
when courts may use their equitable powers and it defines a
broader range of equitable powers available to courts.
a.

Threshold Standard for Judicial Intervention

The MBCA broadens the threshold standard for a finding of
oppression. The new legislation allows the court to dissolve a corporation if, "in a proceeding by a shareholder . . . it is established
that ... the directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive,
or fraudulent."' 2 5 The previous statute allowed dissolution only
119. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975). In Donahue the board caused the corporation to purchase the stock of a retiring shareholder who was the father of the majority
shareholders at a premium price. The court held that "[s]tockholders in close corporations
must discharge their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with [a]
strict good faith standard." Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
120. Id. at 593, 328 N.E.2d at 515, cited with approval in Daniels, 246 Mont. at 137,
804 P.2d at 366.
121. Daniels, 246 Mont. at 137-38, 804 P.2d at 366.
122. See Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 202 Mont. 260, 273, 658 P.2d 1071, 1078 (1983).
See also A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, Part IV, at 171-259.
123. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, Part IV, § 4.01, at
180-82.
124. Id. at 228-29.
125. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938(2) (1991).
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when the directors' actions actually were "illegal, oppressive, or
fraudulent."' 6 By adding the provisions that a demonstration that
directors "will act" in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive, the legislature has established that threats of future oppressive actions are sufficient for the courts to invoke their equitable powers.
The change in the law is a needed one. Threats of future oppressive action certainly violate the reasonable expectations of
shareholders. Frequently, majority shareholders and directors exact concessions from minority shareholders by threatening to take
certain illegal actions (e.g., withholding dividends or eliminating
minority shareholders' participation) if the minority shareholders
will not sell their stock at a bargain price or if the minority will not
take some other action favorable to the majority. Such threats, if
successful in coercing shareholders to "agree" to surrender their
rights, are as inimical as other more direct techniques calculated to
derive minority shareholders of their rights.
The changes in the statute serve to call into question (and
probably overrule) part of the Daniels case. In Daniels, the majority shareholders allegedly attempted to force the minority shareholders to accept a low valuation of the property by threatening
illegal actions. The court found that the threats did not amount to
oppression:
The court's finding that Thomas made a statement in which he
threatened to bleed the assets from T & D Properties also does
not rise to the level of oppressive conduct that would warrant the
ordering of T & D Properties to buy Daniels' shares. Possible future oppressive actions are not sufficient to invoke § 35-1-921,
MCA. On the other hand, if Thomas were to carry through with
his threats, Daniels may then have had a legitimate cause of action in which he could allege that Thomas was engaging in oppressive actions against him as a minority shareholder. However,
the mere possibility of oppression is not sufficient to warrant the
remedy the District Court ordered here. 2 '
The facts of the Daniels case demonstrate the importance of
the changes in the law. If the court is unable to utilize its equitable
powers until the damage is done, it is forced to attempt to remedy
a wrong which may have caused irreparable harm. If the court may
intervene prior to the damage done, it may use its equitable powers to prevent unnecessary losses.
126.
127.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-921(1)(a)(ii) (1989).
Daniels, 246 Mont. at 141, 804 P.2d at 368-69 (emphasis added).
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Discretion to Grant Other Forms of Equitable Relief

The new legislation expressly allows the courts to exercise
their broad equitable powers to fashion remedies other than dissolution. 2 ' The statute gives the court broad authority to make "any
order to grant relief ... as, in its discretion, it considers appropriate."' 2 That relief may include altering the bylaws, altering a corporate resolution, directing or prohibiting certain actions of directors and officers, or requiring a compelled purchase of shares. In
addition, the statute establishes a procedure by which courts may
remove directors "engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or in
gross abuse of authority or discretion ... [if] removal is in the best
' 3
interest of the corporation." '
These new statutory provisions codify part of the holding of
128. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939 (1991) states:
Discretion of court to grant relief other than dissolution. (1) In any action filed by
a shareholder or director to dissolve the corporation on the grounds enumerated in
35-1-938, the court may make any order to grant the relief other than dissolution
as, in its discretion, it considers appropriate, including, without limitation, an
order.
(a) canceling or altering any provision contained in the articles of incorporation, in any amendment of the articles of incorporation, or in the bylaws of the
corporation;
(b) canceling, altering, or enjoining any resolution or other act of the
corporation;
(c) directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of shareholders, directors, officers, or other persons party to the action; or
(d) providing for the purchase at fair value of shares of any shareholder, either by the corporation or by other shareholders.
(2) Relief under subsection (1) may be granted as an alternative to a decree of
dissolution or may be granted whenever, under the circumstances of the case, relief but not dissolution would be appropriate.
This statute is similar to a former Maine statute. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, §
1123 (West 1981).
The new statute expressly authorizing repurchase of shares should avoid the problem
caused by cases such as the Minnesota case of Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co., 390
N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Like the Montana statutes prior to the legislative
changes, the Minnesota statutes expressly permitted courts to order share repurchases for
statutory close corporations but were silent as to court authority to order share repurchases
for all other corporations. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.741 (West 1985). In Sundberg, the court
found that because share repurchase was not specifically authorized, except for statutory
close corporations, the courts could not so order for a business corporation. 390 N.W.2d at
357.
129. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-939 (1991).
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-425(1)(a), (b) (1991). Courts may well have the power to
remove directors even absent statutory authorization. See Brown v. North Ventura Road
Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 232, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1963) ("since directors hold a
position of trust, judicial power to remove them exists independently of statute.") Cf. Harkey v. Mobley, 552 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (taking the position that, because the
statute allowing removal was repealed, the court could not remove the director).
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Maddox v. Norman."' Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court case of
Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock,"'1 the Montana Supreme Court
in Maddox held:
Liquidation is an extreme remedy. In a sense, forced dissolution
allows minority shareholders to exercise retaliatory oppression
against the majority. Absent compelling circumstances, courts
often are reluctant to order involuntary dissolution. [citations
omitted] As a result, courts have recognized alternative remedies
based upon their inherent equitable powers. Thus, in Baker,...
the court authorized numerous alternative remedies for oppressive or fraudulent conduct by the majority. Among those would
be:
'An order requiring the corporation or a majority of its
stockholders to purchase the stock of the minority shareholders at a price to be determined according to a specified
formula or at a price determined by the court to be a fair
and reasonable price.' (footnote omitted)." 3
The Montana Supreme Court in Maddox followed the modern
trend of courts using their equitable powers broadly and creatively
to resolve shareholder oppression and protect the reasonable expectations of the shareholder.134 In addition to ordering dissolution
of a corporation, courts have, with increasing frequency, ordered:
1) The corporation or a shareholder to purchase the shares of ans5
other (usually the minority) shareholder."
2) Partition of the property of the corporation." 6
3) Payment of dividends."'
4) Appointment of special fiscal agents, receivers, or provisional
8
directors to assist under the operation of the corporation."
9

5) Removal of directors."1

40
6) Forfeiture of controlling shareholders' salaries.1
7) Setting aside corporate actions.'"

4
8) An accounting.' '

The new statute provides little guidance as to which of its eq131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

206 Mont. 1, 669 P.2d 230 (1983).
621 P.2d 270, 274-75 (Alaska 1980).
206 Mont. at 15, 669 P.2d at 237-38 (emphasis in original).
Bahls, supra note 61, at 294-312.
Id. at 298-305.
Id. at 305-06.
Id. at 307-06.
Id. at 308-11.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/1

28

Bahls: Montana's New Business Corporation Act
1992]

BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT

uitable powers a court should use when resolving shareholder oppression. A method of determining the most appropriate equitable
remedy cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula. Instead,
courts should develop general standards for evaluating the facts
and circumstances of each case. The following standards allow
courts to arrive at solutions that are both equitable and efficient:
1) The remedy should maximize the ability of minority shareholders to realize their reasonable expectations.
2) The remedy should minimize the administrative costs associated with resolving the dissension.
3) The remedy should maximize the value of the economic unit
while allowing shareholders to
realize value in accordance with
1 43
their reasonable expectations.

Courts should fashion equitable remedies to meet shareholders' reasonable expectations, so that minority shareholders will realize the benefit of their bargained for participation in the corporation. As such, if the shareholders reasonably expect the payment of
dividends in a profitable close corporation, the court could order
payment of dividends. If one director is frequently using his or her
corporate position for self dealing, the court could order removal of
the director or appointment of a custodian to review expenses.
Courts must also minimize administrative costs associated
with resolving shareholder disputes. Administrative costs include
not only the costs of the court's time, but also the costs of attorneys' fees, filing fees and the added costs of management complying with a court order. If recurring litigation is likely, it may not be
efficient for the court, in effect, to manage the corporation by setting aside or ordering various corporate actions. If courts find continuing irreconcilable deadlock or oppression, the costs of using its
equitable power to manage the corporation in such a way as to
meet the reasonable expectations of the shareholders may be too
high. In those cases, partitioning the business, ordering a dissolution or ordering a buyout of a shareholder may be the only viable
solutions.
Court-ordered remedies should maximize the value of the business and allow shareholders to realize value in accordance with
their proportional interests. Typically, then, courts should not order a dissolution and liquidation of the corporation. A liquidation
of a business is a draconian solution resulting in considerable economic waste. Businesses that are liquidated often lose the going
concern value, thereby penalizing both the majority and minor143. Id. at 320.
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ity.1' " Instead, in cases of irreconcilable deadlock or oppression, if

the court is unable to order surgically precise remedies (e.g., ordering payment of dividends, voiding a corporate action), it should
consider other remedies that do not involve a loss of the going concern value of the firm. One of those remedies is partitioning the
business. While partitioning of a business such as a large family
ranch into two viable economic units may be successful, partitioning other businesses into viable economic units may not be
possible.
Sadly, the most efficient and equitable solution may be the
forced buyout of a shareholder. While a forced buyout of a shareholder may not allow that shareholder to realize his or her expectation to participate in a business, it may allow the shareholder to
realize his or her expected pro-rata value of the firm. To fulfill that
expectation, courts should value the shareholders' interest in the
firm in such a way as to allow the shareholder to realize his or her
full fair market value of the firm. Shareholders whose shares are
purchased should not be forced to sacrifice any element of value
representing the going concern value of the firm.14 5 Shareholders
usually expect that they will all be treated equally. Minority shareholders usually expect they will receive their full pro-rata value of
the firm, without a discount for minority shares.14 The new legislation allows courts to use their broad equitable powers to provide
147
both equitable and efficient solutions.
144. Id. at 330-32.
145. Id. at 330-36.
146. Id. at 301-03.
147. One commentator has suggested that to allow courts to select from one of a broad
range of equitable solutions is an "ad hoc approach" that "diminishes the certainty of future
judicial outcomes that, in turn, causes both courts and litigants to increase expenditures in
the litigation process." Schermerhorn, Efficiency vs. Equity in Close Corporations, 52
MONT. L. REV. 73, 87 (1991). To reduce these costs, a statute could rely on self-policing
mechanisms. Schermerhorn suggests that the most "effective self-policing mechanism that is
absent from [the Montana statute] is dissolution-at-will rights." Id. at 86. According to
Schermerhorn "depriving the minority shareholders of dissolution-at-will rights greatly decreases the value of their interests." Id; at 87.
Schermerhorn's suggestion that minority shareholders should have dissolution-at-will
rights is troublesome. Granting dissolution-at-will rights reduces the value of the corporation. Dissolution-at-will rights mean that at any time, for any reason, any shareholder is
able to force the firm into dissolution and liquidation. Untimely liquidations risk loss of the
going concern value of the firm for all shareholders. With such a weapon in hand, the opportunistic minority shareholder holds a sword over the heads of all majority shareholders, even
those who satisfy the reasonable expectations of minority shareholders.
The new legislation does not give shareholders the ability to force dissolution-at-will.
Instead, the shareholder must demonstrate illegality, fraud or oppression before courts may
dissolve the corporation. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938 (1991). Even then, the new statute
recognizes that dissolution may not be efficient and provides for a broad range of other
remedies. While Schermerhorn properly recognizes that efficient solutions minimize court
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LEGISLATIVE CHANGES GOVERNING DERIVATIVE ACTIONS

A second significant area of change under the new statute involves derivative actions. During the 1980s, state courts in other
jurisdictions provoked a meaningful shift in the rules concerning
derivative actions. 48 This shift in the rules has largely bypassed
Montana, because there have been no major derivative action cases
decided by the Montana Supreme Court since 1978.' e The Corporate Law Revision Committee was impressed with the direction of
many of these cases from other jurisdictions, particularly those decided by the Delaware courts.150 The Committee successfully recommended adoption of the ABA Revised Model Act provisions
codifying many of these concepts.
A derivative action is an action brought by one or more shareholders to enforce a right belonging to a corporation. It is "an invention of equity to supply the want of an adequate remedy at law
to redress breaches of fiduciary duty" '5 1 by those in control of a
corporation. Most derivative actions are brought against directors
and/or officers alleging a breach of their duties of care and loyalty.
A derivative action is appropriate when the damage done by the
defendant officers and directors is primarily suffered by the corporation. Derivative actions are to be distinguished from direct actions. Direct actions are actions shareholders bring against officers
for damages to the shareholders that are separate and distinct
from those suffered by the corporation or other shareholders generally. 5 ' In a derivative action, shareholders as a group suffer damages (usually diminution of the value of their stock). In a derivative action, the corporation itself is entitled to recover; in a direct
action, recovery goes to the shareholder directly. 83
The Corporate Law Revision Committee balanced several policy considerations when deciding to opt for the ABA's Revised
costs, efficient solutions should also minimize loss of value of the firm. Rights to dissolve-atwill minimize one cost but not the other. Courts adopting the standard for resolving dissension suggested in this article will balance the need to minimize both court cost and loss of
value of the firm.
148. Block, et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Litigation
at the Turn of the Decade, 45 Bus. LAW. 469, 469 (1990).
149. The 1978 case is S-W Co. v. John Wight, Inc., 179 Mont. 392, 587 P.2d 348
(1978).
150. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
151. Koster v. American Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947).
152. W. KNEPPER & D. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
§ 18.01, at 571 (4th ed. 1988).
153. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 358, at 1037 (3d ed.
1983).
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Model Act. Procedural limitations should not frustrate shareholders with valid claims for a breach of the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty. Management of a corporation, however, should not have to
spend valuable resources defending a derivative action when the
action is nothing more than a strike or nuisance suit. Defense of
frivolous actions saps time and energy from corporate management. The Committee also recognized that, because management
of the corporation is left to the directors, as a general rule, management of lawsuits ought to be left to directors. When, however,
directors cannot act without self interest, courts should permit derivative lawsuits to proceed to a resolution on the merits of the,
cases.
A.

Statutory Modifications to the Demand Requirement on
Directors

Montana corporate law has long required that before a shareholder may bring a derivative action, the shareholder must make a
demand on the corporation that the board of directors provide relief from the grievance."" This rule assumes that after a demand is
made, the corporation might provide the relief requested, obtain
reimbursement from the offending director or officer, or commence
action against the offender. The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
state that in derivative actions, the complaint must "allege with
particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the
action he desires from the directors .. . ."'55 A demand on the
154. See, e.g., S-W Co., at 402-03, 587 P.2d at 354; Sullivan v. Mountain, 117 Mont.
224, 228, 160 P.2d 477, 479 (1945); Cobb v. Lee, 80 Mont. 328, 331, 260 P. 722, 724 (1927);
Deschamps v. Loiselle, 50 Mont. 565, 573, 148 P. 335, 338 (1915); Allen v. Montana Refining
Co., 71 Mont. 105, 122, 227 P. 582, 587 (1924); Moss v. Goodhart, 47 Mont. 257, 264, 131 P.
1071, 1073 (1913); Kleinschmidt v. American Mining Co., 49 Mont. 7, 19, 139 P. 785, 788
(1914); Brandt v. McIntosh, 47 Mont. 70, 73, 130 P. 413, 414 (1913).
155. MONT. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure also require the
shareholders to "allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain
the action he desires .... if necessary, from the shareholders." Id. (emphasis added). The
provisions of the Montana Business Corporation Act do not require that a demand be made
on shareholders. The "if necessary" language of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure
means that whether a demand on shareholders is necessary is left to the relevant business
corporation law. See D. BLOCK, supra note 19, at 488-89.
The legislation does not state whether the shareholder bringing the derivative action
must first make a demand on other shareholders. At least one older Montana Supreme
Court case required a demand on shareholders. Allen v. Montana Refining Co., 71 Mont.
105, 227 P. 582 (1924). In Allen, the court stated:
If the subject matter of the stockholder's complaint is for any reason within the
immediate control, direction, or power of confirmation of the body of stockholders
it should be brought to the attention of such stockholder for action, before an
action is commenced by a stockholder, unless it clearly appears by the complaint
that such application is useless.
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board gives the corporation an opportunity to decide whether or
not to pursue the issue itself. The board must decide whether the
potential recovery justifies the time and expense associated with
recovery.
Although courts have provided that a shareholder must normally make a demand on directors, courts have developed several
exceptions to the general rule for times when the circumstances
would make the demand futile. In its most recent case involving
derivative actions, the Montana Supreme Court described four situations when demand is excused because it would be futile:
1) [A] majority of the present board participated in, approved of,
or benefitted from the alleged wrongful acts;
2) [T]he board, although aware of wrongful acts failed to take
action itself, instead conspiring to conceal these acts from the
shareholders;
3) [T]he individual defendants dominate and control the corporation; and
4) [D]emand would have required the board to institute action
Id. at 123, 227 P. at 587.
The holding of the Allen case, if still valid, would necessitate a demand on shareholders
when shareholders are capable of ratifying the complained about actions. In cases involving
conflicts of interest, for example, state law expressly permits shareholder ratification of contracts that might otherwise violate the duty of loyalty. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-464 (1991).
The holding of the Allen case has been long criticized. In a 1942 law review note,
Grover C. Schmidt, Jr. argued that "[tihe course of Montana decisions up to the Allen case
[did not] require application to the shareholders where there was a recognized corporate
cause of action .... " Note, Corporations:Limitation Upon the Right of a Stockholder to
Bring a Representative Suit in Montana, 3 MONT. L. REV. 105, 109-10 (1942). Schmidt concluded: "Consequently, the natural result of adherence to the rule of the Allen case is to
hog-tie individual stockholders and facilitate management without corresponding ownership, thus making it easier for the directors and managers to avoid being held accountable
for their acts even including positive frauds." Id. at 110.
The Allen case should not serve to require a demand on shareholders under the current
law. The current statutory provisions governing derivative actions are more detailed than
previous statutes and occupy the field. The statutes only require a demand on directors, but
do not require a demand on shareholders. See D. BLOCK, supra note 19, at 489.
The rule that a demand on shareholders is not a prerequisite for a derivative suit is
consistent with the Montana Business Corporation Act. The Act leaves management decisions to the directors, not the shareholders. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-416(2) (1991). As a
general rule, the Act does not contemplate or provide a procedure by which shareholders
may ratify most management decisions. In those cases in which shareholders do have the
power to ratify corporate actions (e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-464 (1991), the directors,
once demand is made upon them, may still ask shareholders to ratify the transaction in
question. Ratification by shareholders, if in compliance with state law, would presumably
preclude the derivative action. In cases where shareholders do not have the power to ratify
board action, demand on shareholders would most always be futile because shareholders
cannot, short of removing and replacing directors, force directors to take any specific action.
See Mayer v. Adams, 39 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458, 462-65 (1958). Similarly, if a demand on
shareholders were necessary, the intent of the provisions of the Montana Business Corporation Act to eliminate unnecessary litigation over procedural barriers would be frustrated.
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against itself." 6
In each of these instances, the Montana Supreme Court assumed
that the directors could not apply independent judgment to ascertain whether the plaintiff's claim necessitated action.
The exceptions created by the Montana Supreme Court to the
rule that shareholders must make a demand are so broad as to
nearly swallow the rule. In most cases involving breach of duty, the
directors have either approved of the decision, or were aware of it
and did not take corrective action. In many cases, those controlling
the corporation are the same as the potential defendants. In most
cases, then, under the previous law demand would be excused.
The previous rules that purport to require demand, but easily
excuse it, create a number of problems. A good deal of judicial
time is potentially wasted determining whether or not demand
should be excused. This issue serves only to lengthen the amount
of time it takes the court to get at the heart of the controversy.
Similarly, the easy waiver of demand is misguided. Even if direc-"
tors are interested in the transaction, a formal demand may still
have utility. A demand on the board gives the board the opportunity "to reexamine the act complained of in light of the potential
' 157
lawsuit and take corrective action.
The new statute includes a universal demand rule requiring a
demand at least 90 days prior to the commencement of the lawsuit
in all cases, except those in which "irreparable injury to the corporation would result" by waiting for 90 days. 158 This provision overrules the judicially created exceptions to demand found in S-W
Company. The new statute should eliminate needless litigation
over demand requirements and allow courts to move quickly to the
issue of whether the suit is in the best interest of the corporation.
B.

Statutory Clarificationof the'Board's Power to Dismiss an
Action

Once a demand has been made and either rejected or ninety
days has elapsed, the shareholder may file a derivative action.'5 9 At
this point, however, an independent board may seek to dismiss the
lawsuit.16 0 The Committee believes that the statute should permit
the board, applying independent business judgment, to terminate
156.
157.
158.
159.

160.

S-W Co. v. John Wight, Inc., 179 Mont. at 403, 587 P.2d at 354.
ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, § 7.42, at 778.2.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-543 (1991).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-543 (1991).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545 (1991).
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litigation. Management of the corporation is with the board. If the
board cannot control lawsuits brought on behalf of the corporation,
its management rights are limited. Even when the board determines that an officer or one of its members breached a duty, it may
make a legitimate business judgment not to pursue the litigation.
As Judge Easterbrook aptly states:
If the directors run the show, then they must control litigation
(versus other remedies) to the same extent as they make the initial business decision. They may conclude that internal remedies
such as discharge or a reduction in compensation are more costeffective for the firm. A lawsuit that seems to have good prospects
and a positive value (net of attorneys' fees) still may be an unwise
business decision because of the value of managerial time that
would have to be invested, time unavailable to pursue the principal business of the corporation. Similarly, a lawsuit that appears
to have a negative net value may be useful to the firm if it deters
future misconduct.' 61
Following Judge Easterbrook's rationale, judicial decisions in
numerous jurisdictions permit directors to dismiss lawsuits in certain circumstances. In Montana, for example, even prior to the new
legislation, if a demand was made and refused by the board, courts
did not always permit a derivative action to proceed. In Brooks v.
Brooks Pontiac,Inc., the Montana Supreme Court recognized that
2
as a general rule it is in the directors' discretion whether to sue.1
If directors "act in good faith, their refusal to sue violates no right
of dissenting stockholders, so as to entitle them to maintain a suit
63
in their own behalf.'
Perhaps the best analysis of the power of a corporate board to
dismiss a suit is found in the Delaware case of Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado.'" In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court observed
that derivative suits have the effect of allowing the shareholders to
"invade the discretionary field committed to the judgment of the
directors .
'"' Unless a board decision to seek dismissal of a
"...
suit is "wrongful," its decision should be respected. According to
the Delaware court, "[a]bsent a wrongful refusal, the stockholder
in such a situation [his or her demand being refused] simply lacks
161. Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
162; 143 Mont. 256, 259, 389 P.2d 185, 187 (1964). See also Noble v. Farmers Union
Trading Co., 123 Mont. 518, 540, 216 P.2d 925, 936 (1950).
163. 143 Mopt. at 260, 389 P.2d at 187 (quoting Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d
748, 762, 144 P.2d 725, 732 (1944)).
164. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
165. Id. at 783 (quoting McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 193 (Del. Ch. 1931)).
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legal managerial power.""'le The Delaware court then found that
the board, or a committee of the board, could effectively dismiss a
derivative action if it was independent and acted in good faith, after a reasonable investigation." 7 It is these concepts of independence (of the board or a committee), good faith and reasonable investigation found in Zapata,' 8 that have been codified by the
Montana statute.6 9
The new legislation provides that the decision to dismiss a suit
may be made either by a vote of the independent directors, if they
constitute a quorum, or the vote of a committee of independent
directors. 7 0 In addition, "upon motion by the corporation, the
court may appoint a panel of one or more independent persons to
make a determination of whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interests of the corporation.' 17 ' The
statute provides guidance as to which directors are considered independent. According to the statute, none of the following will
cause a director to lose his or her independent status:
(a) the nomination or election of the director by persons who are
defendants in the derivative proceeding or against whom action is
demanded;
(b) the naming of the director as a defendant in the derivative
proceeding or as a person against whom action is demanded; or
(c) the approval by the director of the act being challenged in the
derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in no personal
172
benefit to the director.
These definitions are consistent with those described by Delaware courts.1 73 Thus, the definition of independent directors is
broader than that implicit in S-W Company. In S-W Company,
the court implied that directors were not independent if they were
named as defendants or if they approved of the transaction. 74 The
new statute supplants the definition of independence implicit in SW Company. The rationale for rejecting the S- W Company view of
independence is twofold. First, if the S-W Company position that
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 784.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 784-89.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.
MONT.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN. § 35-1-545 (1991).
ANN. § 35-1-545(2) (1991).
ANN. § 35-1-545(6) (1991).
ANN. § 35-1-545(3) (1991).

171.
172.
173. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-16 (Del. 1984).
174. See S-W Co. v. John Wight, Inc., 179 Mont. 392, 403, 587 P.2d 348, 354 (1978)
(dealing with the issue of independence for purposes of determining whether a demand is
futile).
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a director is not independent if he is a defendant in a derivative
action is followed, directors will seldom be considered independent. As such, directors would seldom be allowed to exercise their
business judgment to dismiss a suit. Second, creating artificial presumption of lack of independence is not necessary because court
approval is necessary to dismiss the suit. The court, before granting a motion to dismiss a derivative suit, should look for actual loss
of independence or bias. As the ABA Official Comments state:
"court[s] will be able to assess any actual bias in deciding whether
the director is independent without any presumptions arising out
of the method of the director's appointment, the mere naming of
the directors as a defendant or the directors' approval of the act
"175

In determining whether the directors or a committee of directors are independent, courts should make two inquiries. First,
courts should examine whether the directors in question appear on
both sides of the transaction or whether the directors expect to
derive a pecuniary benefit which is not available to the corporation
and other shareholders generally. 176 Second, courts should determine whether the directors are otherwise beholden to the alleged
wrongdoer in a way likely to affect their judgment. In making this
determination, courts should look to familial relationships, other
personal relationships and whether the director has a close financial or business interest with the wrongdoer.177
The new Montana Business Corporation Act also clarifies that
board committees composed of independent directors may dismiss
lawsuits. 7 8s An independent board committee may be appointed by

independent directors, whether or not those independent directors
constitute a quorum.179 Permitting independent directors to make
a determination dismissing a lawsuit is consistent with Montana
law permitting board committees to make decisions otherwise required to be made by directors.18 0 The modification is also consistent with modern trends in the case law. For example, in Zapata
8
Corp. v. Maldonado,1
1 the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether board committees could dismiss a derivative action, and, if so, whether the same is true if the board itself is not
175.
176.

177.

ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, § 7.44, at 778.10.
See Aronson v Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
See A.L.I.. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 19, § 1.18(a)(2), at

178.
179.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545(2)(b) (1991).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545(2)(b) (1991).

29.

180. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-439 (1991).
181. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
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independent. The court decided that board committees were empowered to dismiss derivative lawsuits."8 2 In Zapata, however, the
court acknowledged the risk that the director members of the committee might be hesitant to pass judgment on fellow directors. In
the words of the court, "[T]he question naturally arises whether a
'there but for the grace of God go I' empathy might not play a
role."' 83 To mitigate this problem, the court stated it would examine two issues when a committee requests dismissal of a lawsuit.
First, it would examine the independence and good faith of the
committee and the reasonableness of an investigation done by the
committee." 4 The corporation would have the burden of proving
independence, good faith and reasonableness of the decision. 8 5
Second, the court would "determine, applying its own independent
business judgment" whether the suit ought to be dismissed. 8
The Delaware court in Zapata was rightfully concerned that a
committee of directors may, consciously or subconsciously, give
their nonindependent colleagues the benefit of the doubt. The Corporate Law Revision Committee, however, did not agree with the
Delaware court's suggested resolution of the problem, that a court
apply its own independent business judgment. Montana courts
have been hesitant to apply their own independent business judgment to disputes. 8s For courts to apply their own independent
judgment entangles courts unduly in management of the corporation. This entanglement requires courts to make judgments that
judges are often not in a position to make. Instead, the Montana
legislation places the burdens of proof on the corporation when the
majority of the board members are not independent. 88 The party
with the burden must demonstrate that the directors or a committee has (a) in good faith, (b) after conducting a reasonable inquiry
upon which its conclusions are based (c) determined that the pro182. Id. at 785.
183. Id. at 787. See also Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 376-77
(6th Cir. 1984).
184. Zapata at 788.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 789.
187. Noble v. Farmers Union Trading Co., 123 Mont. 518, 541, 216 P.2d 925, 936-37
(1950) (quoting Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 762-63, 144 P.2d 725, 732 (1944)
"[tihe exercise of such discretion by the directors will not be lightly set aside by the court,
and where a stockholder complains of such action of the directors the court will consider the
circumstances, and, if no bad faith is shown, will decline to substitute the judgment of the
stockholder for that of the managing directors").
188. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545(5) (1991). The general rule is if the majority of the
board members is independent, the plaintiff has the burden. Id.
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ceeding is not in the best interest of the corporation." s9 The statute
does not anticipate that courts will apply their own independent
business judgment. Instead, courts should limit their review to deciding whether the determination made by the board or a committee "has some support in the findings of the inquiry."' 90
C.

Statutory Provisions Governing Payment of Expenses

The new legislation' 9 ' clarifies the obligations of the losing
party to pay the winning party's expenses. The legislation continues the provisions of the previous law' 9 2 allowing the court to require the plaintiff to pay the defendant's reasonable fees and expenses if the action was brought without reasonable cause or for an
improper purpose. The previous statutory law was silent as to any
corresponding duty of the corporation to pay the successful plaintiff's fees. The new statute provides that a court may order the
corporation to pay the plaintiff's fees and expenses if the court
finds the derivative suit resulted in substantial benefit to the corporation. This provision serves to codify existing state'93 and federal' 9 4 case law.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES GOVERNING CLAIMS AGAINST DISSOLVED
CORPORATIONS

Members of the Corporate Law Revision Committee perceived
of too many instances of corporations dissolving (often by way of
administrative dissolution) but not fully providing for their debts.
Committee members were particularly concerned when corporations dissolve and distribute assets to shareholders but do not adequately provide for their debts. At the same time, Committee
members recognized that legislation should allow those corporations making provisions for their debts to distribute any excess assets to shareholders. Because courts historically encounter diffi189. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-545(1) (1991). This general rule is consistent with previous Montana cases. See, e.g., Noble v. Farmers Union Trading Co., 123 Mont. at 542, 216
P.2d at 937 ("stockholders bringing such action not only have the burden of proving the
material charges entitling the corporation itself to recover, but they must also establish the
grounds entitling them to sue in place of the corporation").
190. ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 20, § 7.44, at 778.15. ("Finally, section 7.44
does not authorize the court to review the reasonableness of the determination. As discussed
above, the phrase in Section 744(a) 'upon which its conclusions are based' limits judicial
review to whether the determination has some support in the findings of the inquiry.")
191. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-547 (1991).
192. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-514 (1989).
193. Sullivan v. Mountain, 117 Mont. 224, 160 P.2d 477 (1945).
194. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
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culty balancing the rights of creditors against the expectations of
shareholders, it is appropriate that the legislature strike that balance.1 95 The Committee addressed the issue of payment of debts of
dissolved corporations by adopting four changes in the law. First,
the new law provides, in certain cases, that known claims against
dissolved corporations must be made within a relatively short period of time. 196 Second, the legislation removes the old five-year
limitation on corporate survival period in which unknown claims
must be made." 7 Third, the statute codifies the common law trust
fund doctrine. 9 a Finally, the statute provides that the rules governing dissolution for domestic corporations apply to foreign corporations transacting business in Montana for unknown claims
otherwise arising or accruing under Montana law.' 9 9
A.

Known Claims Against Dissolved Corporations

Previous law required that dissolving corporations file a statement of intent to dissolve prior to filing articles of dissolution. 0 0
Upon the filing of the statement of intent to dissolve, the corporation ceased doing business, except that business necessary to wind
up its affairs.20 ' After filing the statement of intent to dissolve, the
law provided that the corporation would notify its known creditors. 2 ' The corporation then collected its assets, liquidated its
properties and paid its liabilities.0 3 When the corporation paid its
debts (or made adequate provisions for paying its debts), the corporation would file articles of dissolution. 0 4 The statute required that the articles of dissolution state that "all debts, obligations, and liabilities of the corporation have been paid and
195. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Progressive Tool & Die Co., 463 F. Supp. 117, 120 (E.D.N.Y.
1979). In Gonzales, the court noted:
The inquiry thus must be as to what the legislature would have done had it considered the issue against the background of the common law. This inevitably entails the weighing of conflicting policies, that of corporate repose and certainty
and that of compensating the injured ....
A legislature, far more than a court, has the capability of determining the extent
of the problem and of assessing accurately the overall effect of the choice of one
policy over another.
Id. at 120.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 201-10.
197. See infra text accompanying notes 211-27.
198. See infra text accompanying notes 228-31.
199. See infra text accompanying notes 232-47.
200. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-904 (1989).
201. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-905 (1989).
202. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-906(1) (1989).
203. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-906(2) (1989).
204. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-911 (1989).
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discharged.""°5
The Committee successfully recommended abolition of the
two-step filing process for a number of reasons. The two-step filing
process was cumbersome and entailed needless paperwork. The
objectives of the two-step process, notification of creditors and satisfaction of creditors' claims, could be achieved through a simpler
scheme. The apparent assumption of the two-step filing statute,
that the statement of intent to dissolve would provide creditors notice of the upcoming dissolution, proved unrealistic. Known creditors were to get direct notice from the corporation anyway; unknown creditors are unlikely to monitor the filings with the
secretary of state. The Committee determined that known creditors would be better protected with a statute specifying how claims
were to be made. Unknown creditors would be better protected by
indefinitely extending the corporate survival period, so as not to
bar creditors' claims.
The new legislation provides that corporations may dispose of
known claims by following a special procedure. 0 6 If the procedure
is followed, the statute bars the claims of known creditors who fail
to act in a timely manner. If the corporation does not avail itself of
the statute, the known claims are not barred but subject to the
statute of limitations (i.e., contract statute of limitations) 2 7 otherwise applicable to the claim.
A dissolved corporation is required to notify its known creditors of their right to file their claim with the corporation.2 08 A
claim is a known claim even if it is not liquidated, but a contingent
claim (a claim that has not matured to the point that the claimant
has the right to bring suit) is not considered a known claim. 20 9
The claims of known claimants are barred in two primary circumstances. The notice to claimants must state a time for filing
the claim. If the claim is not received within that time (not less
than 120 days after the notice) the claim is barred. Likewise, if a
claim has been rejected by a corporation and the claimant does not
bring suit within 90 days, the claim is barred.210
The new statutory scheme provides a quick and certain way to
provide for known claims and deters spurious claims made against
the corporation, by requiring claimants whose claims are rejected
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

§
§
§
§

35-1-911(3) (1989).
35-1-936 (1991).
27-2-202 (1991).
MONT. CODE ANN.
35-1-936(2) (1991).
ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, at § 14.06, at 1492.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1992

41

Montana Law Review, Vol. 53 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 1

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

to file suit within 90 days. The legislation balances the need to allow creditors fair notice of dissolution with the need to wind up
corporate affairs.
B.

Unknown Claims Against Dissolved Corporations

The previous version of the Montana Business Corporation
Act did not adequately address the rights of creditors unknown by
the dissolved corporation at the date of dissolution. The statute
simply stated that dissolution "shall not take away or impair any
remedy available . . . against such corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders for any . . .claim existing or any liability
incurred prior to such dissolution if action . . . thereon is commenced within 5 years after the date of such dissolution."2 1' The
previous statute created two problems for unknown creditors.
First, the rights, if any, of creditors owning claims arising after dissolution were unclear.2 12 Second, if the injury giving rise to the
right was suffered after the five-year survival period elapsed, the
creditor had no apparent rights against the corporation.2 3 The
dearth of case law in Montana concerning the rights of creditors in
corporate dissolution compounded the confusion.
The first problem is most frequently manifested by a products
liability claim. What rights does a plaintiff who suffered an injury
after the date of dissolution have against the dissolved corporation
that had manufactured the product causing injury before the date
of dissolution? The previous statute only allows claims "incurred
prior to dissolution."2 4 A products liability claim typically is incurred not when the product was manufactured but as of the date
of injury. Arguably, the claim is barred. The ABA's Official Comments to the Revised Model Business Corporation Act correctly
conclude: "Earlier versions of the Model Act did not recognize the
serious problem created by possible claims that might arise long
after the dissolution process was completed .
,15
2....
211. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-930 (1989) (emphasis added).
212. For an excellent discussion of the confusion caused by the dissolution provision of
Model Business Corporation Act § 105, see Friedlander & Lannie, Post-DissolutionLiabilities of Shareholders and Directors for Claims Against Dissolved Corporations,31 VAND. L.
REv. 1363, 1370-81 (1978) [hereinafter Friedlander & Lannie]. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-930
(1989) was based on Model Business Corporation Act § 105.
213. See Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 212, at 1376-81. Many courts find that if a
claim arises after the five-year survival period elapsed, there can be no claim made against
the corporation. See, e.g., Litts v. Refrigerator Transport. Co., 375 F. Supp. 675, 678 (M.D.
Pa. 1973); Stone v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales Corp., 366 F. Supp. 733, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
214. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-930 (1989).
215. ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, § 14.07, at 1500.
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A review of the history of corporate survival statutes does not
clearly answer the problem. At common law, dissolution of a corporation terminates its existence. As a result, the corporation could
neither sue nor be sued. Dissolution abated all claims.2 16 To mitigate the harshness of this rule all jurisdictions provide for a corporate survival period extending the time in which a dissolved corporation may be sued.2 17 Given the general rule that the common law
still governs those claims outside the exception in the old statute,
those product liabilities claims not "incurred prior to dissolution"
may well be barred.21 8 Several courts, interpreting statutes similar
to Montana's, have denied the claims of those creditors whose
claims first arose after the date of dissolution.2 1 Still other courts,
recognizing the harshness of common law and states providing
short survival periods, have held that post-dissolution claims are
not subject to short-survival statutes.2 20
The Corporate Law Revision Committee determined the legislature should adopt legislation to resolve these ambiguities. It first
looked at the ABA's Revised Model Business Corporation Act for
216. Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability
Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 879-80 (1971). See also ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS supra
note 20, § 14.07, at 1502.
217. ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, § 14.07, at 1505.
218. Courts are unclear as to whether continuation statutes should be narrowly or
broadly construed. Some courts reason that because these statutes are in derogation of common law, courts should narrowly construe the statutes. Gary Furniture & Appliance Co. v.
Skinner, 288 Ala. 617, 623-24, 264 So. 2d 174, 180-81 (1972); MBC, Inc. v. Engel, 119 N.H. 8,
11, 397 A.2d 636, 638 (1979). Other courts find these statutes remedial in nature and give
them broad construction. Lesnow Bros., Inc. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 829, 831 (Ct. Cl.
1948).
219. 16A W. FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8141, at
433-34 (rev. perm. ed. 1988). See also Stone v. Gibson Refrigerator Sales Corp., 366 F. Supp.
733, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 569, 573, 411
N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (1980); Weibel v. Martin Indus., Inc., 806 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. App.
1991) (claim arose nine months after dissolution); Suarez v. Sherman Gin Co., 697 S.W.2d
17, 21 (Tex. App. 1985) (claim arose one month after dissolution).
220. See Levy v. Liebling, 238 F.2d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 353 U.S. 936
(1957). If a district court were to interpret the previous Montana statute as prohibiting any
claim arising after dissolution, arguably their decision would be inconsistent with the Montana Constitution. At art. II, § 16, the Constitution provides "[clourts of justice shall be
open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or
character." Professor Henry F. Johnson argues that the Texas corporate survival statute,
similar to the old Montana survival statute, is unconstitutional pursuant to similar "open
court" provisions of the Texas Constitution. Johnson, The Texas Corporate Survival Statute: An Endangered Species?, 17 Tzx. TECH L. REV. 747, 760-64 (1986). Such an argument,
however, was recently rejected by a Texas Court of Appeals. Weibel v. Martin Indus., Inc.,
806 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App. 1991). The court stated: "We hold there is no violation of [the
open courts provisions] because Weibel's claim against a dissolved corporation did not involve an established right to redress of any injury. The right to hold a dissolved corporation
liable for a post-dissolution claim has never been recognized in Texas ....
Id. at 346.
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guidance. The ABA Model provided that if a dissolved corporation
published notice of its dissolution, unknown claims would be
barred unless claims were made within five years.22 1 The Committee rejected the ABA Model for two reasons. First, it is unreasonable to expect an unknown claimant to actually read the newspaper
notice when it is published. Tort claimants rarely expect to be tort
claimants and rarely peruse the legal sections of newspapers of
general circulation prior to suffering their injury. Second, the Committee determined that a five-year extension period was simply too
short. The Committee was concerned about the many claims that
arise after five years. Many losses are not known for a decade or
more.222 Most tort statute of limitation periods address this problem by requiring a claim to be made within a specified period after
the loss is discovered or the accident occurs.2 2 3
The Committee vigorously debated the appropriate length of
the corporate survival period. On one hand, shareholders of dissolved corporations have an interest in protection from extended
litigation after dissolution. Opting for an unlimited survival period
impairs the ability of the corporation to wind up its affairs and
forces shareholders who receive assets from the corporation to hold
them subject to the claims of creditors.22 Uncertainty may preclude the shareholders from redeploying the assets received into
other productive ventures. Even with a short survival period, corporations have difficulty fully winding up their affairs because of
221. Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 14.07 (1984).
222. Mark Sarlitto observes the problems with a five-year limitation period:
Insurance industry statistics, however, suggest that only thirty percent of expected
general liability claims (which include products liability) are reported three years
after the initial policy year and only sixty percent are reported after the eighth
year. Not until thirteen years after the initial policy year are seventy-five percent
of the losses known to the insurer. The balance of these losses develop over the
next two decades. These statistics suggest that a substantial proportion of products liability claimants are precluded from recovery by a five-year abatement
period.
Note, Recognizing Products Liability Claims at Dissolution: The Compatibility of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 COLUM. L. Ray. 1048, 1052 (1987) (authored by Mark
Sarlitto).
223. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-102 (1991).
224. According to the court in Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.
Iowa 1968):
There should be a definite point in time at which the existence of a corporation
and the transaction of its business are terminated. To allow . . . the continued
prosecution of lawsuits perverts the definiteness and orderly process of dissolution
so as to produce a continuous dribble of business activity contrary to the intent of
the ... statute.
Id. at 96.
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the exceptions that exist to lengthen survival periods,1 5 and because other states permit suits against dissolved foreign corporations after the expiration of the survival period. 2 6
A short survival period, however, impairs the rights of those
injured by the company's products. As most claims arise many
years after the date of manufacture of a product, a short limitation
period will cause substantial losses. The price of products should
bear the full costs of injuries caused by the products. Allowing corporations to escape responsibility by dissolving allows corporations
and shareholders to walk away from this responsibility. Requiring
dissolved corporations to bear these costs will encourage shareholders to reserve adequate funds for future claims. If shareholders
are content that reserves established for unknown debts are adequate, they should be comfortable redeploying excess assets to
other productive endeavors.
In the final analysis, the majority of the Committee members
were convinced that abolishing the limited survival period would
encourage corporations to reserve sufficient funds for claims. If
shareholders believed that reserves were sufficient they could confidently redeploy assets; if not they should not redeploy assets.
Likewise, just as otherwise applicable statutes of limitations are
sufficient to balance the rights of the injured with the need for certainty for ongoing businesses, they were sufficient for dissolved
corporations. Finally, the Committee was convinced that injured
parties should not have different rights to pursue the assets of a
dissolved business causing injury, depending on whether that business happened to be a sole proprietorship, partnership or
corporation.
Montana is not alone in abolishing a limited corporate survival
period. In eliminating the limited survival period from the corpo17
rate code, Montana joins the ranks of ten other jurisdictions.
C.

Codification of the Trust Fund Doctrine

The common law has long provided that when assets of a corporation have been distributed to shareholders in dissolution, the
225. These exceptions include claims arising from injuries to minors, failure to notify
creditors or fraudulent inducement to delay claims. See, e.g., Moore v. Nick's Finer Foods,
Inc., 121 Ill. App. 3d 923, 460 N.E.2d 420 (1984); People v. Parker, 30 Ill. 2d 486, 197 N.E.2d
30 (1964); Edwards v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 79 Ill. App. 2d 48, 223 N.E.2d 163 (1967).
226. North Am. Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905, 225 Cal.
Rptr. 877, 879 (1986).
227. ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, § 14.07, at 1505 (1989). Those jurisdictions are Arizona, California, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio and Virginia. Id.
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shareholders hold those assets as trustees for creditors. 228 Each

shareholder is liable to creditors to the extent of assets he or she
receives. Courts, although generally agreeing on most of the parameters of the trust fund doctrine, disagree whether the doctrine
allows creditors to recover from shareholders after the survival period expires." 9 At least one court went so far as to hold that the
common law trust fund theory is not effective when not expressly
included in a state statute governing dissolution.230 The new legis-

lation adds certainty to the law by codifying this common law doc-

trine.2 3 ' The abolition of the limited survival period renders aca-

demic the question of whether the trust fund doctrine applies after
the period's expiration. Under the new law, only the otherwise-applicable statute of limitation will extinguish a claim.
D. Application of Dissolution Provisions to Foreign
Corporations
As a general rule, the law of the state of incorporation governs
the ability of creditors to sue the dissolved corporation. 32 A significant number (although still a minority) of states have departed
from this rule. 33 Courts adopting the majority position view the
limited survival periods not as statutes of limitation, but as a substantive rule defining the existence of the corporation. If the majority rule were followed in Montana, several undesirable results
would follow. Only plaintiffs injured by the products of a dissolved
Montana corporation would benefit from the new Montana unlimited survival period. If the same plaintiffs had been injured by a
dissolved Idaho corporation, they would be required to file their
228. 16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8161, at
517 (rev. perm. ed. 1988 & supp. 1991); Norton, Relationship of Shareholder to Corporate
Creditors upon Dissolution:Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus. LAW. 1061 (1975).
229. Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 216, at 1381-99.
230. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 407, 758 P.2d 1182, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 651 (1988).
231. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-937(2)(b) (1991).
232. Marion Phosphate Co. v. Perry, 74 F. 425, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1896); Casselman v.
Denver Tramway Corp. 195 Colo. 241, 244, 577 P.2d 293, 295 (1978); Gassert v. Commercial
Mechanisms, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 392, 393 (Minn. 1979); Bayer v. Sarot, 51 A.D.2d 366, 369,
381 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490-91 (1976), aff'd 41 N.Y.2d 1070, 396 N.Y.S.2d 184, 364 N.E.2d 848
(1977); Quarture v. C.P. Mayer Brick Co., 363 Pa. 349, 353, 69 A.2d 422, 424 (1949); Country
Cupboard, Inc. v. Texstar Corp., 570 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Bazan v. Kux
Mach. Co., 52 Wis. 2d 325, 333-34, 190 N.W.2d 521, 524-25 (1971).
233. See, e.g., W.T. Ratliff Co. v. Henley, 405 So. 2d 141, 144 (Ala. 1981); North Am.
Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 3d 902, 906, 225 Cal. Rptr. 877, 880 (1986);
Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982); Advance Mach. Co. v. Berry, 378 So.
2d 26, 27 (Fla. App. 1979).
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claim within two years of the date of dissolution.2 " Montana plaintiffs would suffer from the vagaries of the laws of a manufacturers'
state of incorporation. Manufacturing corporations otherwise desiring to incorporate in Montana may prefer to incorporate elsewhere
to avoid the disadvantages of Montana's pro-creditor dissolution
provisions. Finally, in a products liability claim against two dissolved corporate codefendants, the Montana codefendant may be
the only one subjected to liability. For example, assume a plaintiff
injured in Montana brings a products liability claim against a dissolved Idaho corporation (with a two-year dissolved corporation
survival period) and a Montana corporation (with no separate dissolved corporation survival period) three years after the date both
corporations dissolved. If Montana courts honored the short Idaho
survival period, the dissolved Idaho corporation would be free from
liability. The Montana corporation may be the sole defendant legally responsible.
The status of Montana law concerning claims against dissolved foreign corporations is uncertain. The leading case, Mieyr v.
Federal Surety Co., dates back to 1933.35 In Mieyr, the Montana
Supreme Court held that a claim by a Montana plaintiff against a
dissolved Iowa corporation was not abated upon the entry of a decree of dissolution in Iowa.2 36 The court rejected the position that
the laws of the state of incorporation (in this case Iowa) controlled
the rights of a Montana claimant for the purposes of a foreign corporation. It did so based on the Montana Constitution then in effect and a Montana statute. At the time, the Montana Constitution provided that "no ... corporation formed under the laws of
any other country, state or territory, shall have, or be allowed to
exercise, or enjoy within this state any greater rights or privileges
than those possessed or enjoyed by corporations of the same or
similar character created under the laws of [Montana]. 2 3 7 This
provision has been subsequently removed from the Montana
Constitution.
The court in Mieyr, however, also relied on a provision of the
Montana statute that provided that "all foreign corporations ...
shall be subject to all the same liabilities, restrictions, and duties
which are or may be imposed upon corporations of like character
organized under the laws of [Montana].23 8 This statute, although
234.
235.
236.
237.

238.

IDAHO CODE § 30-1-105 (1991).

94 Mont. 508, 23 P.2d 959 (1933).
Id. at 522, 23 P.2d at 963.
MONT. CONST. OF 1889, art. 15, § 11.
MONTANA REVISED CODES § 6659 (1921).
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modified, survives intact today.2 39 In addition, however, the current statute states that the Montana Business Corporation Act
"does not authorize [Montana] to regulate the organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation." This provision is necessary
to avoid subjecting corporations to inconsistent and duplicative
regulation of matters of organization and internal affairs. It also is
consistent with common law240 and avoids unduly burdening interstate commerce.24 '
The Corporate Law Revision Committee wanted to clarify
whether the unlimited survival limitation period applied to foreign
dissolved corporations for claims arising in Montana. Arguably, the
Mieyr case was no longer valid law because of the changes in Montana's Constitution. Likewise, issues concerning dissolution might
be issues of "organization or internal affairs," thereby exempting
foreign corporations from the Montana abolition of the limited
survival period for dissolved corporations. In order to clarify this
issue, the new legislation adopts the rationale of Mieyr by stating
that the dissolution rules concerning claims "apply to foreign corporations and their shareholders transacting business in [Montana]
for any claims otherwise arising or accruing under Montana
2 42
law.
The members of the Corporate Law Revision Committee were
cognizant of the problems the legislation might cause for foreign
corporations. A dissolved Idaho corporation, for example, would
have a two-year survival period for claims arising in Idaho and an
unlimited survival period for claims arising in Montana. The Idaho
policy of quick and dirty dissolution might be frustrated. In balancing the Idaho policy with the policy of Montana to compensate
injury to plaintiffs, the Committee relied upon the analysis in
North American Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court.24 3 In North
American Asbestos Corp., the court dealt with the conflict between
California law (no limitation period) and Illinois law (at that time,
a two-year limitation period)." The court found that the burden
239. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1030(2) (1991).
240. McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987); Amatuzio v. Amatuzio, 410
N.W.2d 871 (Minn. App. 1987); Allen v. Montana Ref. Co., 71 Mont. 105, 727 P. 582 (1924).
See also 17 W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
8425, at 452-63 (1987); ABA OFFICIAL COMMENTS, supra note 27, § 15.05 at 1632.
241. For a discussion of the obligations of states not to impose regulations unduly
burdening interstate commerce, see FLETCHER, supra note 240, §§ 8402-08 at 335-56.
242. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-937(3) (1991).
243. 180 Cal. App. 3d 902, 225 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1986). See also Trounstine v. Bauer,
Pogue & Co., 144 F.2d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 777-78 (1944); Dr.
Hess & Clark, Inc. v. Metalsalts Corp., 119 F. Supp. 427, 428-29 (1954).
244. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 180 Cal. App. 3d at 905-06, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
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on California plaintiffs exceeded the burden on Illinois dissolving
corporations. 4 5 The court concluded that when the corporate code
of the state of incorporation for claims against dissolved corporations differs from the corporate code in the jurisdiction in which
the claim arises, the law of the jurisdiction in which the claim
- 6 The Committee believes that corporations
arises controls.24
doing
business in several states should (with minimal burden) be able to
reserve funds for claims asserted after the limited survival period
in their home jurisdiction expires. The legislative determination to
subject dissolving foreign corporations doing business in Montana
to the same rules as domestic corporations is particularly appropriate in view of the mandate of Article XIII(2) of the Montana Constitution: "The legislature shall provide protection ... for the people against harmful and unfair practices by either foreign or

domestic corporations

....
V.

"247

CONCLUSION

The corporate governance statutes of a state must balance the
need to protect the individual rights and obligations of stakeholders of a corporation (including shareholders and creditors) with the
group rights of stakeholders of the corporation generally. The balance is a delicate one. Courts and legislatures grapple (in Montana
and other states) with innovative methods of striking a proper balance. From time to time it is useful for the organized bar to review
existing Montana legislation and court decisions, compare that law
and those decisions with those of other states, and ask whether
Montana law might be improved. I hope that the new Montana
Business Corporation Act is a useful improvement, the benefits of
which will be enjoyed until the turn of the century and beyond.

245. Id. at 906-07, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
246. Id. at 907, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
MONT. CONST.
art. XIII, §of1,Montana,
cl.2 (1972).
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